PART I
1.

THE ENGLISH STORY OF SOVEREIGNTY

In the United States, jurists have loosely ascribed the origins of the body
sovereign to juristic expressions around the King of England. That is, they understand
that sovereign immunity is tied into the King in some special way that warrants further
understanding; they turn to Blackstone and cite several passages relating to the
preeminence of the King;1 or to the infallibility of the King;2 or to the prerogative of the
King;3 or to the requirement of the King’s consent before he may be sued;4 or that all

1

See e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *242 (“And, First, the law scribes to the king
the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence”). Blackstone continues his though “he is
said to have imperial dignity; and in charters before the conquest in frequently stiled [sic]
basilius and imperator the titles respectively assumed by the emperors of the East and the
West. His realm is declared to be an empire and his crown imperial by many acts of
parliament… which at the same time declare the King to be the supreme head of the
realm, in matters both civil and ecclesiastical, and of consequence inferior to no man
upon earth, dependent on no man, accountable to no man.” 2 id at *242 Thus, though
skipped by Justice Kennedy, this is the basis for the prior statement, and its conclusion:
“Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in Civil matters,
because no court can have jurisdiction over him. 2 id. at 242 cited in Alden, 527 U.S. at
715. Hereinafter, Blackstone’s Commentaries will be referred to as COMMENTARIES.
2
See e.g., Nevada v Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (though rejecting the notion of
executive perfection, noted its historical relevance towards uncovering sovereign
immunity); see also 2 COMMENTARIES, supra note 7 at *238-39 (“Besides the attribute of
sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute
perfection. The king can do no wrong. Which antient and fundamental maxim is not to be
understood, as if every thing transacted by the government was of course just and
lawful…”). Blackstone continues telling us that “The king … is not only incapable of
doing wrong, but ever of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in
him is no folly or weakness.” Id.
3
See e.g., Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 64 (1926 (J. McReynolds, Concurring)
(“Blackstone affirms that the supreme executive power is vested by our laws in a single
person, the king or queen, and that there are certain branches of royal prerogative, which
invest thus our sovereign lord, thus all perfect and immortal in his Kingly capacity.”); see
also 2 COMMENTARIES supra note 7 at *239 ( “By the word prerogative we usually
understand that special pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and above all other
persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity…

land in England derives ownership from the Crown.5 And certain that the fiction only
reaches as far as the King, they ignore the deeper more probing questions that reach the
heart of the fiction: why is the King infallible; why must the King consent before being
sued; and more probing, why is there no difference between the King’s personal property
and his kingly property; and how these attributes inform the King’s posture towards the
realm.6 Such analysis requires not only an eye towards the mystical but a sort of

It must be in it's nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights
and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those
which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects: for if once any one prerogative of
the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cease to be prerogative any
longer”); 2 id at *243 (“and, first, as to private injuries; if any person has, in point of
property, a just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of chancery,
where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon
compulsion… ‘A subject, fays Puffendorf, so long as he continues a subject, hath no way
to oblige his prince to gave him his due… For the end of such action is not to compel the
prince to observe the contract, but to persuade him.”)[SIC].
4
See e.g,, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 103 (1996) (J. Souter,
Dissenting); see also 2 COMMENTARIES supra note 7 at *235 (“Hence it is, that no suit or
action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have
jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power: authority to try
would be vain and idle, without an authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would
be contemptible, unless that court had power to command the execution of it; but who,
says Finch, shall command the king?”); 2 id. at *221(“the queen hath also many
exemptions, and minute prerogatives. For instance: the pays no toll; nor is the liable to
any amercement in any court”). [SIC]
5
See e.g., Hall,440 U.S. at 415 (“The King’s immunity rested primarily on the structure
of the feudal system”); see also 2 COMMENTARIES supra note 7 at * 281 (“when I say
that it has subsisted time out of mind in the crown, I do not mean that the king is at
present in the actual possession of the whole of this revenue. Much (nay, the greatest
part) of it is at this day in the hands of subjects; to whom it has been granted out from
time to time by the kings of England: which has rendered the crown in some measure
dependent on the people for it's ordinary support and subsistence. So that I must be
obliged to recount, as part of the royal revenue, what lords of manors and other subjects
frequently look upon to be their own absolute rights, because they are and have been
vested in them and their ancestors for ages, though in reality originally derived from the
grants of our antient princes.”). [SIC]
6
I primarily have in mind Justice Stevens’s opinions in United States v. Dalm, wherein
he decries sovereign immunity as “majestic voices” with a “haunting charm.” Id. at 616.
Continuing on, Justice Stevens heroically defends Bull v. United States, saying the court

reverence towards kingly things – a quality the American courts are not naturally inclined
towards. To the extent that American judges have considered the King in realm, they
have done so based on antiquarian concepts that all but became irrelevant by the time of
American independence; this is Justice Jay’s plight in Chisolm v. Georgia. Indeed,
American courts have never really understood kingly sovereignty.7
We begin with the various opinions of Chisolm v. Georgia, the first case to
discuss sovereign immunity in the United States. Three of the five justices undertook to
ascribe some relation of sovereign immunity to the relationship of the King to the people.
Chief Justice Jay, in the shortest of these descriptions juxtaposes the sovereignty of the

then, “reasoned not in obedience to these siren-like voices but rather under the reliable
guidance of a bright star in our jurisprudence: the presumption that for every right there
should be a remedy. Id. citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803).; or
his opinion in Nevada v. Hall, where Stevens said sovereign immunity “ought not be
celebrated.” “We must of course reject the fiction [sovereign immunity]. It was rejected
by the colonists when they declared their independence from the crown… But the notion
that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases.” Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1978); or again in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
suggesting that the doctrine of Sovereign immunity continues to flourish despite the
perishing of its “raison d’être.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87
(1988). Indeed, Stevens sees sovereign immunity as an attribute of the institutions shed in
our countries founding.
I also have in mind, a series of cases I discuss in more detail below that
purposefully associate the Kingship with principles of sovereignty, like Chisolm v.
Georgia and U.S. v. Lee.
7
There is a way of reconciling Justice Stevens opinions, and the opinions in Chisolm v.
Georgia and U.S. v. Lee despite their incomplete inquiry. That inquiry would ask not
what is the true rationale of the sovereign, which would undertake an inquiry similar to
the one I undertake in parts II and III; rather it would ask what is the rationale for the
sovereign in 1787 when the U.S. Constitution was ratified. That inquiry is oblivious to
historical integrity and instead would allow for the distaste towards kingly things that
Stevens wants to find. Said slightly differently, perhaps for purposes of the revolution
and government forming, Jay’s feudal king is exactly the inflammatory image necessary
to underscore American independence. See infra text accompanying notes 8-10.

people of the United States to the sovereigns in Europe that “exist on feudal principles.”8
Jay’s description of the “sovereign of Europe” is characterized in general as a tyrant: he
is the object of allegiance; he is above persons in his kingdom; “he is the fountain of
honor and authority;” all franchises are granted by his grace alone; etc…. 9

The

description of sovereign prerogative by Jay explains for him why the King could not be
sued by a subject, and why any court judgment was not mandatory upon him but mere
advice.10 Jay’s revolutionary rhetoric reminds the reader that Chisolm v. Georgia was
decided a mere ten years after the colonists had settled their own contest of sovereignty
with the King and suggests a historical context for Jay’s highly critical approach – a
contest that led towards the writing of the Constitution that Jay was now attempting to
interpret.
Like Jay, Wilson places the primary emphasis of sovereignty on the feudal
qualities of the King. But Wilson also reveals another characteristic of sovereignty – that
of the law giver.11 “The principle is that all human law must be prescribed by a
superior.”12 That superiority, Wilson informs us, was started with the Conqueror in 1056
and not only operated to create jurisdiction over others, but to exclude himself from the
same jurisdiction. Thus Wilson says that “no suit or action can be brought against the
King, even in civil matters; because no court can have jurisdiction over him; for all

8

Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471 (1793). “If then it be true that the
sovereignty of the nation in in the people of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of
each state in the people of each state, it may be useful to compare these sovereignties
with those in Europe, that we may thence be enabled to judge, whether all the
prerogatives which are allowed to the latter are so essential to the latter.”
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 458.
12
Id.

jurisdiction implies superiority of power.”13 Yet for Wilson, in the United States the
people are sovereign, and therefore no sovereign immunity attaches to governments in
America like it does in England.
Justice Iredell proceeds differently. Conceding that the United States is the
successor in law to England, he looks to what types of cases could be heard against the
King.14

Iredell’s description, then, of the common law rights against the sovereign

begins with the “Petition of Right,” which since Edward I, was the only right of action
against the sovereign of England.15 Iredell’s opinion is as formalistic as it is long. A
brief summary of points shall be sufficient. First, giving great deference to Lord
Somers,16 Iredell found that the Right of Petition against the King did not include a right
against the Exchequer in a court of law as the court had no authority over the treasury.
Therefore no right of action exists in the American states that might threaten legislative
13

Id. at 459.
Id. at 437 (Iredell) (“If therefore no new remedy be provided (as plainly is the case),
and consequently we have no other rule to govern us but the principles of the pre-existent
laws, which must remain in force till superceded by others, then it is incumbent upon us
to enquire whether previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which period, or the
period of passing the law, in respect to the object of this enquiry is perfectly equal) an
action of the nature like this before the court could have been maintained against one of
the states in the union upon the principles of the common law, which I have shewn to be
alone applicable”[SIC]).
15
Id; but see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L REV. 1, 2 (1963) (Suggesting that suits against government officials
connected to the king proceeded under basis other than “petitions of right”); Susan
Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2002)
(following the Jaffe argument that other actions lie against the king). Indeed, Louis
Jaffee suggests that the Petition of Right has been “over generalized into the broad
abstraction of sovereign immunity. Id. at 3. Jaffe argues this in an attempt to suggest
that other actions against palace and government officials weakened sovereign immunity.
However, Jaffe seems to have omitted one certainty in his historical argument from
England – there is only one sovereign and only one whom sovereign immunity truly
applies.
16
We shall return to Lord Somers opinion in Calvin’s Case in Part II “The Gemina
Persona.”
14

purses.17 Second, the Right of Petition exists as a grace by the regent.18 Third, the King
as corporation has the authority to subject corporations he establishes to his prerogative.19
Under these basis, and since no law had overturned these principles, Iredell, as the lone
dissenter, believed the state of Georgia was protected by sovereign immunity.
Wilson’s description of the “sovereign people” seems to explain the differences
between the English Sovereign and his immunity and sovereign immunity in North
America; of course, the rational was used to abrogate sovereign immunity not to create it.
Interestingly though, the Wilson rationale does support sovereign immunity in U.S. v.
Lee.20 The Court in Lee concludes that the people are sovereign and that consent of the
legislature as representatives of the people is required for a suit to proceed against the
government. Like Chisolm, the Court in Lee looks back to English tradition to
understand why the consent of the sovereign is required for suits to proceed.

17

Id. 437-39. Iredell comes to this conclusion after reviewing the Bankers case, reported
in 1 FREEMAN’S REPORTS at 330 (1691). It seems that King Charles II accepted loans
from several bankers with tallies given from the exchequer. Interest was paid on the
loans until 1683, when it fell in arrears. The barons presented the payment case to the
barons of the exchequer, who granted payment. The attorney general presented the
concise question to the court whether such grants were valid under English law. The
court held that the king could alienate the revenues of the crown and that the petition to
the barons was the proper remedy. The court’s more precise holding was that it had no
authority to hear this case, but rather the Lord High Treasurer was the proper authority.
18
Id. at 442 (citing Puffendorf, “a subject say Puffendorf, so long as he continues to be
subject hath no way to oblige his prince to give him his due when he refutes it; though no
wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract. And if the prince gives the
subject leave to enter an action against him upon such contract, in his own courts, the
action itself proceeds rather upon natural equity than upon the municipal laws. For the
end of such action is not to compel the prince to observe the contract, but to persuade
him”).
19
Id. at 449. Iredell’s opinion suggests that because the State of Georgia was not a
corporation “under the United States” it could not be subject to the sovereignty of the
United States. We will also address the corporate nature in further detail in Part II “The
Gemina Persona.”
20
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).

As regards the King, one reason given by the old judges
was the absurdity of the King’s sending a writ to himself to
command the King to appear in the King’s court….
“The broader reason is that it would be inconsistent
with the very idea of supreme executive power, and would
endanger the performance of the public duties of the
sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a matter of
right at the will of any citizen and to submit to the judicial
tribunals the control and disposition of his public property,
his instruments and means of carrying on his government in
war and in peace, and the money in his treasury.” 21
Thus, for Justice Miller, the practical effect of the King serving himself together with the
inconsistency of a suable sovereign with supreme power made sovereign immunity a
necessity.
By means of summary, the historical perceptions of kings and sovereign
immunity by the United States Supreme Court can be isolated into several distinct
aspects. First is the concept of the King as infallible.22 Second, the King is supreme and

21

Id. at 206 (citing Briggs & Another v. Light Boats, 11 Allen (Mass), 157.).
See e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) (Jackson, J.) (“The Tort
Claims Act was not an isolated and spontaneous flash of congressional generosity. It
marks the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign
immunity from suit. While the political theory that the king could do no wrong was
repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the crown is immune from
any suit to which it has not consented was invoked on behalf of the republic and applied
by our courts as vigorously as it had been on behalf of the crown”); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974) (Burger, J.) (ascribing the king’s infallibility as a basis for
sovereign immunity and extending to officers); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979)
(Stevens, J.) (“The king’s immunity rested on a fiction that the King could do no
wrong.”); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n. 24 (1997) (Stevens, J. ) (citing Nevada
v. Hall for infaliability as basis of King’s immunity). Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,
451 U.S. 401, 429 (1981) (Burger, J. Dissenting) (“The trend to eliminate or modify
sovereign immunity is not an unrelated development; we have moved away from “the
king can do no wrong”). United States v Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 622 (1990) (Stevens, J.
Dissenting) (“Sovereign immunity has its origin in the ancient myth that the “king can do
no wrong”); See also similar dissenting opinions by Justice Stevens e.g., Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87 (1989) (Stevens, J. Dissenting);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996) (Stevens J. Dissenting).
22

cannot be forced to submit to any other jurisdiction except that which he consents to.23
Third, the King as law giver is only subject to the laws he consents to as determined by
his prerogative.24 And fourth, subjecting the King to courts would confuse the supreme
executive power of the King, and therefore be unwise.25
All of these rationales are true. Each describes an aspect of the sovereign King
that together supported the body sovereign. But seen by way of our jurisprudence, the
picture of the King is a confused array of qualities with no understanding for their basis
in tradition, much less their grounding in the realm. The next part looks at the King more
completely.
One explanation for the American failure to fully appreciate “kingly things” is the
dysfunctional relationship America held with the King in its formative years. Indeed, “in
the beginning,” American Constitutionalism has an inconsistent identity as both a
constitutional and a revolutionary solution to despotism; pertinently both are mutually
exclusive of one another.26 This is not just semantic. Rather, the consistent use of
inconsistencies recognizes that the American state starts with two diametrically opposed
ends. We should not then be surprised that our legal formulations that are so closely tied
to these beginnings are equally dysfunctional. On the one hand, we claim sovereign

23

Hall, 440 U.S. at 415 (“Since the King was at the apex of the feudal pyramid, there was
no higher court in which he could be sued; the King’s immunity rested primarily on the
structure of the feudal system); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (Kennedy, J.)
(“And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence …
Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters,
because no court can have jurisdiction over him”).
24
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
25
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).
26
See CHARLES I. MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 2 (1924) (noting the inconsistency that “Constitutional” and
“Revolutionary” rhetoric was used in the formative era).

immunity is necessary for government operation, and at the same time we cringe from its
meaning.27
This part is specifically about how beginnings and sovereignty are intertwined.
However, its not interested in American beginnings except by association and by certain
broad conclusions at the end. Rather, its primary focus is English beginnings.
Understanding sovereignty in America requires a keen eye towards our original model of
sovereignty and the later developed perceptions of that model. Like King Oedipus, who
can’t escape his family history, America continues to embrace British things, without
concretely understanding why.
Chapter II, shows how incomplete the American image of the monarchy is,
focusing on the Kingship’s mystical, theological and dynastic underpinnings. Chapter III
considers the King’s Powers. Chapter IV asks the crucial question that American courts
have failed to ask: having taken stock of the King’s attributes, how does this “sovereign”
relate to his realm. Specifically it presents three images: King as conqueror / landlord;
King as father; and King as trustee. In each case the narrative of beginnings is
highlighted to show that the question of sovereignty rests as much on the “story we tell”
as it does on the nature of his being. Finally, Chapter V considers the American
Perceptions of Kingship, and the theories of Sovereignty that develop apart from the
King.
***
A word of pause. The temptation in reading antiquarian conceptions is to dismiss
the findings as notions long passed – particularly as the work draws upon mystic
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Ala Justice Stevens discussed supra note 12.

foundations of current constitutional doctrine. The introduction to Ernst H.
Kantorowicz’s seminal work on the King’s Two Bodies encapsulates those fears:
Mysticism when transposed from the warm twilight
of myth and fiction to the cold searchlight of fact and
reason , has usually little left to recommend itself. Its
language, unless resounding within its own magic or mystic
circle will often appear poor and even slightly foolish and
its most baffling metaphors and highflown images, when
deprived of their iridescent wings, may easily resemble the
pathetic and pitiful sight of Baudelaire’s Albatross.
Political mysticism in particular is exposed to the danger of
losing its spell or becoming quite meaningless when taken
out of its native surroundings, its time and its space.28
But the temptation as great as it may be, is in reality a diversion. We were told by
modernists like Locke and Hobbes that the pre-modernists were full of quaint but
misguided notions and that the modernists held the true meaning of government. We
now live in a confusing and illogical time where those that have moved beyond
modernity -- literally the post moderns reject their own forbearers and seek their own
truth. The problem of the post-moderns is the failure to locate a narrative in which their
norms can be housed. Both the Moderns and Pre-Moderns provided society with allencompassing narratives that, though fantasiful at times, grounded their theory in
concrete and demonstrable ways. To date, the Post-moderns have yet to find a narrative
that they can latch onto. Nevertheless, certain strands of post-modern theory occasionally
appear in Constitutional discourse. This project’s philosophical contribution is to help
the post-moderns realize that there are certain givens that we can trust.

28

Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political
Theology 3 (Princeton 1957).

A.
THE GEMINA PERSONA

Twin Born with Greatness, subject to the breath of every fool
Whose sense no more can feel but his own wringing
What infinite heart’s ease must Kings neglect that private men enjoy!
What king of god art thou, that suffer’st more of mortal griefs than do thy
worshippers.
William Shakespeare, King Henry V, iv.i.254f

The King of England can be called a corporation. This was the Frederick W.
Maitland’s famous thesis in his work Crown as Corporation.29 But what does this mean.
In Sir F. Polluck’s words, which Maitland begins with, it means: “The greatest of
artificial persons, politically speaking is the state…In England, we now say that the
Crown is corporation: it was certainly not so when the King’s peace died with him, and
“everyman that could forthwith robbed another.”30 And by artificial persons, Pollock
means to tell us that corporations have a “continuous legal existence not necessarily
depending on any natural life.31
The distinction by Maitland, Pollock and others describes a mystical aspect of the
Kingship: that the King is a gemina persona, human by nature and divine by grace.”32
This dualism originally cast in a medieval world, and obvious to all with aspirations of

29

F.W. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation, 17 L.Q.R.131, 131 (1901).
POLLUCK, FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 113.
31
Id. at 111.
32
ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 87 (1957) (hereinafter Kantorowicz).
30

understanding kingly things (see i.e. Shakespeare’s King Richard II)33 explained how the
King could die, and at the same time how the Crown could yet continue.34 It explained
the divine principles of the King conflated with the mortal and imperfect body of a man.
To be sure, the King’s two bodies is a contradiction, but not an unworkable contradiction.
Indeed that contradictory dualism spawned a most important aspect of the sovereign – his

33

In an illuminating chapter on the pervasiveness of the King’s corporate nature,
Kantorowicz draws upon Shakespearean prose as recognizing the King’s Duality. Of
note are a quote from Henry V discussing the duality of the God-head and man-head
nature of the King: “Twin Born with Greatness, subject to the breath of every fool Whose
sense no more can feel but his own wringing; What infinite heart’s ease must Kings
neglect that private men enjoy! What king of god art thou, that suffer’st more of mortal
griefs than do thy worshippers.” Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 24 citing WILLIAM
SHAKESPHEARE, HENRY V, iv.i.254f. In other examples, Kantorowicz notes that it is the
very twin natured kingship that forms the “substance and essence” of The tragedy of King
Richard II. See id. at 26. Indeed, Kantorowicz carefully suggests to us that the essence
of Richard II lies in the vasilization and in turn “vasilizing” of the King between man and
immortal. Perhaps the most illuminating passage from Richard II is pronounced by the
Bishop of Carlilse, who says:
What subject can give sentence on his King?
And who sits here that is not Richard’s subject?
And shall the figure of God’s majesty,
His Captain, Steward, deputy-elect,
Anointed, Crowned, Planted many years,
Be Judged by subject and inferior breath,
And he himself not present? O Forefend it, God,
That in a Christian climate souls refined
Should show so heinous, Black, obscene deed!
Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Richard II, Act. IV, i. 121ff.
34
A part of mediaeval philosophy that modern readers often times fail to grasp is the
consistency with which two contradictions can exist within the same body. So for
example, the Virgin Mary can be both the mother and daughter of Christ simultaneously.
The duality of roles represents the collision with the temporal with the mystical, and
certainly influenced political thought of the middle ages. See Kantorowicz, supra note
37, at 101. Indeed, all of Kantorowicz work is aimed at showing a link between the
sacradotum and the regnum as played out in medieval culture. See also Maitland, supra
note 34, at 132 (drawing clear reference to the influence of medieval theology on
mediaeval politics). Similar dueling contrasts abound in medieval political practice: City
of God versus City of Man; Spiritual Sword versus Temporal Sword etc…

eternal nature and divine commission. The result is a King with two bodies -- one
political and one natural.
Perhaps the most efficacious mode of understanding the role of the King’s two
bodies in relation to the body sovereign is to first grasp the two most prominent
contemporary works on the King’s dual nature: F.W. Maitland’s The Crown as
Corporation and Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies. Both are remarkably
different, though each draw on the same premise: that the dual nature of the King tells us
something about his attributes as a sovereign. For Maitland, the exercise is one of
understanding contradictions as manifested in space and time. For Kantorowicz, the
exercise understands the King’s two bodies as defining a mysticism of the sovereign. As
will become clear in this section, my approach is to understand how the sovereign is
limited and at the same time empowered in the body of the King, certainly an ever
present tension for American constitutionalists grappling over whether the U.S.
Constitution empowers or limits federal authority. The end of this part describes the
King’s two bodies as manifested in Magna Charta.
a.

F.W. Maitland and “The Crown as Corporation”

Maitland’s pivotal work on the nature of the King begins by attributing its
corporate nature to a dimension of ecclesial law and policy towards property. Maitland
in a prior work suggests that corporation law developed because the church desired to
maintain a fee simple in property outside of its clerics.35

35

But as Maitland says,

F.W. Maitland, The Corporation Sole, 16 L.Q. REV. 335, (1900). By “Corporation
Sole” Maitland refers to a provision in Sir Edward Coke in his chapter on the English
Law of Persons identifying a “Corporation Sole.” See SIR EDWARD COKE, 2a COKE’S
REPORTS at 250. What Maitland means to tell us about the “Corporation Sole” is that it is
a juridical person that is specifically identified by a specific individual. Thus, as Littleton

“unfortunately, the thought occurred to Coke that the King of England ought to be
brought into one class with the parson: both were to be artificial persons and both were to
be corporations sole.”36

Thus, Maitland cautiously ventures two remarks about the

King’s “parsonified” nature.37
The first feature that Maitland wants to illuminate is the relationship between the
King as corporation sole, and the King as “head of corporation.” While English lawyers
may have perceived first and foremost a “Henry” as a human, 38 metaphor, no matter how
fantasiful was not lost. So the perception of the nation as a community, pictured as a
body, of which the King was head was an easy picture given the ease of relation of the
deified son of God as the head of his ecclesial community.39

would suggest, a parson is a Body politic identifiable by a specific body of the Parson.
See Corporation Sole at 337. For the most part the corporation soles that Coke
understood were ecclesial, but there were two others: the King of England and the
Chamberlain of the City of London. Regarding the Chamberlain of London, Maitland
only finds one example of the civil officer pursuing claims based on his corporate
persona. See Corporation Sole at 340 citing 8 Edw. IV, f. 18 (Mich. Pl. 29). To this end,
we are content to pursue the chamberlain’s dual persona no further.
But as to the King, Maitland’s history supports Kantorowicz’s mystical nature of
the Kingship. See infra section b, on The King’s Two Bodies.
36
Crown as Corporation supra note 34, at 131.
37
Id. at 132. Maitland in Crown as Corporation concedes a certain mystical quality,
calling the King “Parsonified,” instead of calling the state personified. Id. at 132.
38
Id. In a striking comment towards the realism character of the common law, Maitland
says that English lawyers were never really adept at the mystical. “They like their
persons to be real, and what we have seen of the parochial glebe has shown us that even
the church (ecclesia particularis) was not for them a person. In all the year books I have
seen very little said of him that was not meant to be strictly and literally true of a man, of
an Edward or a Henry.”
39
The New Testament abounds with references to the headship and incorporation of the
church into the Body of Christ. See e.g., Romans 12:4-5 (just as each of us has one body
with many members, and these members do not all have the same function, so in Christ
we who are many form one body, and each member belongs to all the others); I
Corinthians 11:3 (Now I want you to realize that the head of every man is Christ, and the
head of the woman is man, and the head of Christ is God); Ephesians 1:10 (to be put into
effect when the times will have reached their fulfillment—to bring all things in heaven

The image of the realm as community, Maitland also sees in Parliament.
The ‘commune of the realm’ differed rather in size and
power than in essence from the commune of a county or the
commune of a borough. And as the comitatus or county
took visible form in the comitatus or county court, so the
realm took visible form in a parliament.”40
And so the description of knowledge within the realm is not surprising when one
considers that Parliament is an ever-present expression of the realm: “Everyone is bound
to know at once what is done in Parliament, for Parliament represents the body of the
whole realm.”41

Thus, the Parliament as the realm, with the Lords and Commons

together with the King, was said to be a corporation by common law.42

As an

explanation of King and Parliament as government of the people, the analogy is as good
as any other.
But curiously, the corporate body described above also seemed to hold “private
rights,” owning personal lands and chattels. Maitland reminds us of Henry VIII’s vivid
picture of the body politik with himself as head.
Where by divers sundry old authentik histories and
chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this
realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted
in the world, governed by One supreme Head and King,
having the dignity and royal estate of the Imperial Crown
of the same, unto whom a Body Politik, Compact of all
sorts and degrees of people and by names of spirituality and
and on earth together under one head, even Christ); Ephesians 4:15 (Instead, speaking the
truth in love, we will in all things grow up into him who is the Head, that is, Christ);
Colossians 2:10 (and you have been given fullness in Christ, who is the head over every
power and authority) amongst others.
40
Crown as Corporation supra note 34, at 133.
41
Id. citing Y.B. 39 Edw. III. F.7.
42
Id. citing Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII. f. 3. (Mich. Pl. 2): “the parliament of the Lords and the
king and the commons are a corporation.” Note that Blackstone refers to this same
formulation, not as corporation but as “Constitution.” See infra notes ___, and text
accompanying.

temporality been bounden and owen to bear next to God, a
natural and humble obedience.43
Thus, from Henry’s perspective the “body Spiritual” and the “body politik” culminates in
the King. Maitland identifies Henry’s break with the Roman Church as the historical
background to a new found conflation of spiritual and political composites of the English
Crown. Indeed, as Maitland says, under Henry, “were not all Englishmen incorporated in
King Henry? Were not his acts and deeds, the acts and deeds of that body politic which
was both realm and church?”44
The concrete way that spiritual and material conflation manifested itself was
towards lands owned by the King in his person. Thus for example in 1562, a dispute
regarding the King’s capacity to lease certain lands came before the court of the Dutchy
of Lancaster. During King Henry VIII’s reign, he executed a lease for twenty-one years
to a certain individual known as W.C. Upon his death Edward VI ascended to the throne
at the age of ten. He immediately executed a similar lease as Henry VIII, for twenty-one
years to an individual named R.W. During the lease, Edward VI died and Elizabeth I
ascended to the throne. Queen Elizabeth inquired to the court whether she must honor
the lease or could avoid it because of Edward’s infant capacity.
In describing the King’s particularly natures, the court said:
So that he [the King] has a body natural adorned and
invested with the estate and dignity royal, and he has not a
body natural distinct and divided by itself from the office
and dignity royal, but a body natural and a body politic
together indivisible, and these two bodies are incorporated
into one person and make one body and not divers, that is
the body corporate in the body natural et e contra the body
natural in the body corporate. So that the body natural by
43
44

Id. citing 25 Hen.VIII c.12.
Id. at 134.

the conjunction of the body politic to it (which body politic
contains the office, government, and majesty royal) is
magnified and by the said consolidation hath in it the body
politic.45
But the contradiction was too much to ignore. The contradiction became apparent as the
defendants began their argument:
The King has two capacities, for he has two bodies, the one
whereof is a natural body… the other is a body politic, and
the members thereof are his subjects, and he and his
subjects together compose the corporation, as Southcote
said, and he is incorporated with them and they with him
and he is the head and they are the members, and he has the
sole government of them.”46
So is the corporate sole of the King the King himself, or the King as head of the realm? 47
Maitland finds another aspect of the Kingship perhaps more mischievous He
says:

45

Crown as Corporation, supra note 34, at 134 citing Case of Dutchy Lane at Segent’s
Inn, Plowden’s Reports 213.
46
Crown as Corporation, supra note 34, at 135.
47
This is question we shall return to in Part III, where we consider the nature of the body
sovereign. For now, the dualistic description of the king shall suffice. Another found in
the same report says:
For the king has in him two bodies, viz, a body natural and
a body politic. His body natural (if it be considered in
itself) is a body mortal, subject to all infirmities that come
by nature or accident, to the imbecility of infancy or old
age, and to the like defects that happen to the natural bodies
of other people. But his body politic is a body that cannot
be seen or handled, consisting of policy and government,
and constituted for the direction of the people and the
management of the public-weal, and this body is utterly
void of infancy, and old age, and other natural defects and
imbecilities which the body natural is subject to, and for
this cause, what the king does in his body politic cannot be
invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his natural
body.
Plowden 212a.

we are taught that the King is two ‘persons,’ only to be
taught that though he has ‘two bodies,’ and ‘two capacities’
he ‘hath but one person.’ Any real and consistent
severance of the two personalities would naturally have led
to the ‘damnable and damned opinion,’ productive of
‘execrable and detestable consequences,’ that allegiance is
due to the corporation sole and not to the man.”48
Thus by tying the King to two bodies, the embodiment of the realm enjoyed the same
loyalty as the realm itself.
Practically, the fiction had the effect of tying the King’s personal lands and
personal monies into the lands of the Common weal and the Exchequer. This effect had
at least one ironic and somewhat humorous episode in the history. Over the course of
several years, the King’s fiscal responsibility declined to the point that Parliament was
forced to take over the King’s lands and in exchange give him a set remuneration. The
legislation made the King’s lands unalienable – both lands held by virtue of being the
Crown and those he held as a natural person.49 So, during the reign of King George III,
the regent was forced to go to Parliament to ask permission to hold lands as a man and
not as King, “for he had been denied rights that were not denied to ‘any of His Majesty’s
subjects.’”50
A second thing that Maitland would like to tell us about the King’s two bodies is
that the fictive qualities of the King became offensive towards the realm – the very thing
the King was supposed to embody.51 The opinion of the jurists at Sergent’s Inn serves to
illuminate a second aspect of the duality ever-present in the King’s body. On the one
48

Crown as Corporation supra note 34, at 135.
As a side note, at the beginning of each monarch’s reign, he renews the corporation
formed to hold the lands of the crown on behalf of Parliament. The corporation is known
as the Crown Estate. See http://www.crownestate.co.uk/.
50
Crown, supra note 34, at 136 (citing 39 & 40 Geo. III. C. 88).
51
Crown, supra note 34, at 135.
49

hand, the King was as frail and as vulnerable to stupidity as any human. But on the other,
he was infallible, incapable of stupid decisions, and more importantly, always continuing
in the natural body of the new King.
A most ingenius argument by at least one litigator before the King’s Bench
developed from this line of thought. Following the 1715 rebellion, an act of Parliament
was passed that vested all estates of those deemed to be traitors in the King, for the “use
of the Publik.”52 As Maitland tells us, one of those traitors was Lord Derwentwater. This
particular traitor owned lands that he leased to certain tenants, who paid a “fine” on the
fee holder’s death. Thus, the question the tenants wanted to know is that since their new
lord in fee was the King, and the King never dies, are they still bound to pay the
particular fine. Perhaps if the obligation required anything other than the payment of
money, the tenants argument would have been more successful. But another law was
passed by Parliament during the reign of King George II deeming the King’s death in
such case the same as if he were a private person. As Matiland pointedly perceives, even
the public body of the King must be “deemed to die now and then for the benefit of cestui
que trust.”53
Perhaps most irreconcilable of all the fictions surrounding the King’s two bodies
for Maitland is his eternal qualities. On the one hand, Maitland says “we are plunged into
talk about King’s that do not die…”54 On the other, though, the temporal demise of the
Crown seems to have had a halting effect for the government. Thus, “at the delegator’s
death, the delegation ceased. All litigation not only came to a stop but had to be begun
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I Geo. I, Stat 2, c.50.
Crown, supra note 34, at 137.
54
Id. at 135.
53

all over again.”55 Though pervasive throughout English law, Maitland seems to wonder
out loud whether the fiction was worth the mental exercises when it caused such chaos
when proven untrue. Indeed, “when on the demise of the Crown we see all the wheels of
the state stopping or even running backwards, it seems an idle jest to say that the King
never dies.”56
Ultimately, Maitland finds the fictions that surround the King – that of his duality,
his eternal and divine qualities amongst others, renders the Kingship having set astray the
corporate nature of the Crown.57
b.

Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s “The King’s Two Bodies”

If Maitland wants to say that the King’s two bodies was a foolish folly,
Kantorowicz wants to redeem the concept by reading it in the context of the period that
the political ideology developed – namely a religiously charged culture where religious
symbolism permeated worldly institutions. Indeed, in a time when church and state
competed against one another for preeminence in a social sphere, Kantorowicz does not
see the King’s two bodies as a mistake of history but rather evidence of a political liturgy
that explains the nuanced relationships between states, Kings, laws and subjects.
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Id. at 136. Maitland says further: “We might have thought that the introduction of
phrases which gave the King an immortal as well as a mortal body would have
transformed this part of the law. But no. The consequences of the old principle had to be
picked off one after another by statute.” By way of example, Maitland shows us how up
through Queen Victoria’s reign, the new monarch had to renew all military commissions.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Crown as Corporation, supra note 34, at 144. After citing a case that refers to the
American state as similar to “corporations,” Maitland concludes that “the American state
is, to say the least, very like a corporation: it has private rights, power to sue and the like.
This seems to me the result to which English law would naturally have come had not that
foolish parson led it astray.”

For Kantorowicz, the mystical is the point. As Maitland would ascribe the
description of the “Crown as Corporation” to either an ignorant folly or an ingenious
borrowing from church law, Kantorowicz would tell us its no accident that the King
developed two bodies. He traces the development to thirteenth century church dogma
where the “body of Christ” became bifurcated between the true body of Christ and the
mystical.
The change may be vaguely connected with the great
dispute of the eleventh century about transubstantiation. In
response to the doctrines of Berengar of Tours and to the
teaching of heretical sectarians, who tended to spiritualize
and mystify the sacrament of the altar, the church was
compelled to stress most emphatically, not a spiritual or
mystical, but a real presence of both the human and the
divine Christ in the eucharist. The consecrated bread was
now significantly the corpus vernum (true body) or corpus
naturale (natural body) or simply corpus christi (body of
christ)…. That is to say, the Pauline term originally
designating the Christian church now began to designate
the consecrated host; contrariwise, the notion corpus
mysticum, hitherto used to describe the host, was gradually
transferred to the church as the organized body of christian
society united in the sacrament of the altar.58
The result was the concept of seeing two bodies of Christ: Simon of Tournai wrote that
“Two are the bodies of Christ: the human material body which he assumed from the
virgin and the spiritual collegiate body, the ecclesiastical college.”59 Similarly,
Kantorowicz points us to Gregory of Bergamo: “One is the body which is the sacrament,
another the body of which it is the sacrament….One body of Christ which is he himself,
58

Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 196. In this sense, Kantorowicz suggests that the
expression “mystical body” which originally had a liturgical or sacramental meaning took
on a connotation of sociological content.” Id. That is to say, the sacradotum and the
seculrum had sufficiently merged so that their terminologies became interchangeable.
Thus, we could speak of the sacred kingship and the Most Holy Roman Emperor in the
same way we could refer to the Church of Rome as the “Empire of Christ.”
59
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 198 citing Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 122.

and another body of which he is the head.60 In this example, -- “in the Bodies natural
and mystic, personal and corporate, individual and collective of Christ,” Kantorowicz
claims to have found the precise precedent for “the King’s two bodies.”61
As we have said before, Kantorowicz sees the development of the King’s two
bodies through theologically-oriented mystical lenses. So it is little surprise that he sees
the King’s qualities that derive from his nature in the same way. Specifically, his eternal
qualities have as much to do with mystical understandings of “time” as they do with the
practical understandings of space.
First, as to time, Kantorowicz tells us that the development of the eternality of the
King evolved at approximately the same time as the question of understanding time came
to the forefront in philosophical and theological discussions. The crux of this new
conflict between the previously accepted Augustine perception that time is created, and
the now revived Aristotelian concept that time was infinite (and therefore not created).62
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Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 198, citing Gregory of Bergamo, De Veritate Corporis
Christi, c.18, ed. H.Hurter, Sanctorum Patrum Opuscula Selecta (Innsbruck, 1879), Vol.
xxxix, 75f. For other theological examples of Christ’s Two Bodies, see Kantorowicz, at
198-99 (citing Guibert of Nogent, De Pignoribus Sanctorum, II PL (discussing the
“bipartite body of the Lord (corpus dominicum bipertitumi); (citing examples of Innocent
III’s distinction between the individual body and the collective body); (citing William of
Auxere’s differentiation of the body Natural “(corpus naturale) with the corpus
mysticum”).
61
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 272.
62
Id. at 274-75. Augustine comes to grips with Time as the creation of God, like himself
in Book 11 of the Confessions:
at si cuiusquam volatilis sensus vagatur per imagines retro
temporum et te, deum omnipotentem et omnicreantem et
omnitenentem, caeli et terrae artificem, ab opere tanto,
antequam id faceres, per innumerabilia saecula cessasse
miratur, evigilet atque attendat, quia falsa miratur. nam
unde poterant innumerabilia saecula praeterire quae ipse
non feceras, cum sis omnium saeculorum auctor et
conditor? aut quae tempora fuissent quae abs te condita non

To be sure, time was bounded in the church, for without bounded time, there was no
creation or end. As Kantorowicz aptly describes, such a view was not the view of the
divine being: “for the aeternitas of God was timeless; it was static eternity without
motion, and without past or future; it was as Augustine called it, “a now ever standing
still,”63 or, as Dante put it, “the point at which all times are present.”64
But such ideas that time was eternal instead of created did lead to scholastic
thought that led to a vision of an “unlimited continuity that was neither tempus nor
aeternitas.”65 One such manifestation was the revival of the notion of an eon (aevum), a
category of endless infinite time, knowing past and future (in contrast to eternity which
knows no past or future), but which had a beginning with no end.66 Three types of time

essent? aut quomodo praeterirent, si numquam fuissent?
cum ergo sis operator omnium temporum, si fuit aliquod
tempus antequam faceres caelum et terram, cur dicitur quod
ab opere cessabas? idipsum enim tempus tu feceras, nec
praeterire potuerunt tempora antequam faceres tempora. si
autem ante caelum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur
quaeritur quid tunc faciebas? non enim erat tunc, ubi non
erat tempus.
St. Augustine, The Confessions, 11:13:15.
In contrast, the Aristillean notion of time being uncreated and to a certain extent
co-existent with God, Kantorowicz assigns to the work of the Averroists who supported
the “eternity of the world” Kantorowicz supra note 37, at 276. Showing the wide
sweeping influence of Aristotle, Kantorowicz points to a passage from Thomas Acquinas,
himself an Aristilean interpreter who suggested at least the possibility that the world had
no beginning. See Summa Theol., I QU. 46, art. 2: “Respondeo Deicendum, quod
mundum non simper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest.”
63
See Kantorowicz, supra note 37, citing Confessions, supra note 67 (nunc semper
Stans).
64
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 279 citing Dante, Paradiso, xvii, 18. Kantorowicz
devotes the last chapter of his work defining the King as man, primarily bound by time as
a limiting factor on his sovereignty. See Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 451 et seq.
65
Id. Kantorowicz assigns this shift in temporal understandings to a confluence of John
of Scot’s translation of Pseudo-Dionysis, the theological writings of Boethius, and the
works produced by the school of Gilbert de la Porrre.’”
66
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 279.

therefore had to be distinguished. First, aeternitas, which belonged solely to the realm of
God. Second, tempus, which likewise was held in the realm of man. Thus, aevum, fell
between the two, and belonged to the realm of angelic beings. In a summary statement
that details the complicated nature, Kantorowicz tells us that “if God was the immutable
beyond and without time, and if man in his tempus was the mutable within a mutable and
changing finite time, then the angels were the immutable within a changing, though
infinite aevum.”67
What started with the heretical concept that time was boundless, developed
towards a redefining of the meaning of time and thereby the worldly institutions that
inhabit time. Thus, though “one did not accept the infinite continuity of a world without
end,” he did accept a quasi infinite continuity and “began to act as though it were
endless.”68 Accordingly, one began to “presuppose continuities where continuity had
been neither noticed nor visualized before.”69 Falling in line were conceptions of human
creation that could have similar eternal qualities.
Illustrative of a sempieternal institution, medieval scholars could look to two
prominent institutions – the Church and the Roman Empire. To be fair, medieval jurists
67

Id. Kantorowicz points to the Aquinas teaching that “every angel represented a species:
the immateriality of the angels did not allow the individuation of the species in matter, in
a plurality of material individuals.” In contrast, one must consider the writings of Duns
Scotus, who suggested that the ubiety of angels argued against such thoughts. See
Alexander Broadie, Duns Scotus on Ubiety and the Fiery Furnace, 13 BRIT. J. FOR THE
HIST. OF PHIL. 3, 18 (2005) (“There were believed to be substances, such as angels, which
can be present at a place but not in a quantitative way, that is, not in such a way as to be
coextensive or commensurate with it. An angel can be present at a place but only in such
a way that the whole of the angel is present at every part of the place. If we wish, we can
say that an angel has ubiety, as a way of acknowledging the fact that an angel can be
present at a place even if in a non-quantitative manner. But, plainly, such ubiety is
ubietas improprie dicta”).
68
Kantorowicz, supra note 37 at 283.
69
Id.

could not conceive of a world without the church.70 Thus, the Augustinian influenced
tenet by William of Ockham, “it cannot be that there be no church – ecclesia nulla esse
no potest,”71 became simply the maxim “Ecclesia nunquam moritur, the church never
dies.”72 The Roman empire also shared historical value as a sempiternal institution. For
example, the church father Jerome identified Rome as the last of the four world
monarchies prophesied in Daniel – an empire that was to continue to the end of the
world. Kantorowicz tells us that Jerome’s interpretation was well received, even
spawning a new theory that “the fourth monarchy was followed by a fifth – that of Christ,
implicating the Roman church as the sempiternal inheritor of Rome.73
But with the problem of sempiternity, also comes a problem of vestment. That is,
Rome was conceived on the notion that the Roman people conferred its imperium on the
ruler. As Kantorowicz points out though, if Rome and the empire were “forever” it
followed that the Roman populous likewise was forever, no matter who may be
substituted for the original people of Rome. This concept of the Roman people being the
same, though different, runs through texts interpreting Roman law which recognized the
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Perhaps the greatest work of fiction from the middle ages, The Canterbury Tales, posits
a social order wherein the Parson’s tale “radically redefines the nature of the tale-telling
itself.” He rejects the mythical, extraordinary and outlandish for concrete manifestations
of mystical encounterings. As we recall, the host of the journey suggests the tale-telling
to shorten their way and “a means of comfort and myrthe on their journey. Thus, the
Parson, reminds the tale-tellers that their journey is grounded in reality not myth, though
fantastic the story may be. See Lee Patterson, From the Parson’s Tale and the Quitting
of the Canturbury Tales, 34 TRADITIO 331-80 (1978). In many ways the Parson
represents the ever-present reality, reminding the travelers of the church’s presence and
that they define the story.
71
See WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS 3:1:2. The Concept is Augustinian because it
infers a normative worldview in which there perpetually remains the incarnation of the
City of God in the Church.
72
Kantorowicz, supra note 37 at 292.
73
Id. at 293.

“principle of identity despite changes or ‘within changes.’” 74 The result postured a
unique and interesting dichotomy: royal heads claiming to be eternal and appointed by
God holding kingly courts over peoples with sempiternal qualities, but comprised of
temporal beings. That is, the persons that form the corporation are not bound by space,
but rather they are linear successors of the empire – all together at the same time, forming
the Republic, assenting to Caesar, and watching her fall.
What makes the Kingship a corporation is a curious realization that the plurality
of persons comprising the corporation need not simultaneously exist, but rather could
exist in succession. “Normally, the plurality of persons needed to form a collective body
was constituted” both “horizontally” (in time) and “vertically” (in succession).75 But once
it was discovered that plurality need not be restricted to “space, but could unfold
successively in time, one could discard conceptually the plurality in space altogether.”76
Thus, as Kantorowicz elegantly states the point:
That is to say, once constructed a corporate person, a kind
of persona mystica, which was a collective only and
exclusively with regard to time, since the plurality of its
74

Id. 294. Kantorowicz cites for us the example of the continuity of a law court though
judges may have been replaced by others:
For just as the [present] people of Bolognia is the same
that was a hundred years ago, even though all be dead now
who then were quick, so must also the tribunal be the same
if three or two judges have died and been replaced by
substitutes. Likewise [with regard to a legion] even though
all the soldiers may be dead and replaced by others it is still
the same legion. Also, with regard to a ship, even if the
ship has been partly rebuilt, and even if every single plank
may have been replaced, it is nonetheless the same ship.
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 295 (citing Glos.ord. , on D.5.1.76 v.). Of course,
Maitland also tells us that in England such conclusions were not easily grasped. See
supra text accompanying notes 23 et seq.
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Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 311.
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members was made up only and exclusively by succession;
and thus one arrived at a one-man corporation and fictitious
person of which the long file of predecessors and the long
file of future or potential successors represented, together
with the present incumbent, that “plurality of persons”
which normally would be made up by a multitude of
individuals living simultaneously. That is, one constructed
a body corporate whose members were echeloned
longitudinally so that its cross-section at any given moment
revealed one instead of many members – a mystical person
by perpetual devolution whose mortal and temporary
incumbent was of relatively minor importance as compared
to the immortal body corporate by succession which he
represented. 77
Having thus, outlined how the King was able to break from temporal reality, we shall
now consider the specific effects of a “King that will not die.”
Kantorowicz understands the maxim rex qui nunqum moritur --“the King that
never dies” as being girded on three factors: the perpetuity of the dynasty, the corporate
character of the Crown, and the immortality of the royal dignity. We shall address these
one at a time.
By alluding to the dynastic qualities of the Kingship, Kantorowicz wants to
separate the condition upon which a King might be elected (say endorsed by the Pope)
and the condition that a King may be King by virtue of his entitlement. This is precisely
the distinction that Kantorowicz draws attention to in showing the examples of Phillip III
of France and Edward I of England coming to the throne and beginning their reigns
without Papal sacralization. Kantorowicz thus says:
Henceforth the King’s true legitimation was dynastical,
independent of approval or consecration on the part of the
church and independent also of election by the people. The
“Royal Power,” wrote John of Paris, “is from God and from
77

Kantorowicz supra note 37, at 312-13.

the people electing the King in his person or in his house,
in persona vel in domo.” Once the choice of the dynasty
had been made by the people, election was in abeyance: the
royal birth itself manifested the prince’s election to
Kingship, his election by God, and divine providence.78
And Kantorowicz demonstrates how this move from anointing a King to anointing the
King reveals itself in juristic writings of England. In Glanvill, the maxim appears “only
God can make an heir.”79 Two more interesting statements reveal more. First,
Archbishop Cranmer, addressing Edward VI’s coronation in 1547 says that Kings
be God’s anointed, not in respect of the oil which the
bishop useth, but in consideration of their power which is
ordained… and of their persons, which are elected of God
and indued with the gifts of his spirit for the better ruling
and guiding of this people. The oil if added, is but a
ceremony: if it be wanting, that King is yet a perfect
monarch notwithstanding, and God’s anointed as well as if
he were inoiled.80
More fully described in other parts, Kantorowicz uses the quote above to describe the
contradiction that despite the trend away from anointing Kings, nevertheless they
remained known as “the anointed.”81
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Kantorowicz supra note 37, at 330. The vivid image the Dutches of d’Abrantes
provides us in her memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte snatching the crown from Pope Pius
VII and crowning himself Emperor of France immediately comes to mind as both
suggestive and contrary to this idea. That is emperors and kings need not be vested by
religious organs to be made regents. On the other hand, Kings and Emperors must be
vested by something other than themselves, presumably God.
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71 (G.D.H. 1965).
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Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 318, citing Schramm, A History of the English
Coronation 139 (1937).
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One such example is the anointment / reanointment of King Edward II. Edward II
became king during the Campaign against the Scots in 1307 when his father Edward I
demised. He was crowned by the Bishop of Winchester because the Archbishop of
Canterbury was unavailable. Thus, Edward II wanted to know from the Pope whether
being reanointed King, in England and by the Archbishop of Canterbury would be
improper. Pope John XXII’s response was rather direct: because the anointing “left no

Second, Lord Coke in the famous Calvin’s Case infers the continuation of the
King, even during the interregna, or time between the death of the King and the
coronation of his successor. Calvin’s Case,82 reported in Coke’s reports garner rather
simple facts.

Robert Calvin was a Scottish born person born three years after the

coronation of James VI of Scotland. The Coronation of James VI united Scotland and
England under the same royal house. After the coronation of James, Calvin by and
through his guardians (as he was not of legal age) obtained land in England. Richard and
Nicholas Smith entered his lands and Calvin’s guardians sued. Richard and Nicholas
Smith’s defense was simple: because Calvin was an alien, he could not own land in
England.83
The entire matter revolved around when the King of England was deemed to
accept his Kingship and the effects that his coronation had on his subjects. The two
defendants, in a measure of audacity suggested that before the King’s coronation, “he
was no complete and absolute King,” a statement Coke took to mean that logically before
a King was crowned, any act of violence against the King could not be treason for lack of
a head to commit treason against.84 In an elaborate opinion, Coke reports that the nature
of the Kingship was inheritable; that is “the King of England held the kingdom of
imprint on the soul” he could repeat his anointing if desired. The interpretation that
Kantorowicz recommends is that the anointing of kings there ceased to garner any
sacramental value. See Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 321.
82
See IV Coke Reports at 3.
83
Id. at 4. The argument of the defendants is simplified in the text here. Their argument
actually nuanced nine discreet matters that Coke refines by four words: (1) Ligeantia:
that Calvin made two allegiances, one to Scotland and one to England; (2) Regna: though
the king binds several nations within himself, he is due the separate allegiance of each
nation, and therefore, Calvin could owe only one allegiance; (3) Leges: the laws of both
kingdoms bears this result; and (4) Alienigena: Calvin is an Alien and not entitled to the
protection of the King as against his subjects.
84
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England ‘by birthright inherent’ and without any essential ceremony or act to be done ex
post facto: for coronation is but a royal ornament and solemnization of the royal descent,
but no part of the title.”85 Coke seems to make clear that though the King may die, his
peace does not die with him.86
The second aspect that Kantorowicz wants to emphasize about the perpetual
nature of the King is the nature of the Crown as corporation.

And by Crown as

Corporation, Kantorowicz wants to emphasize the corporal image of “the Crown”
representing the object of the monarchy, such as in Baldus de Ubaldis’s statement: “With
regard to the succession of the son, I do not consider an interval of time; for the Crown
descends on him in continuity, albeit that the exterior Crown demands an imposition of
the hand and the solemnity of the offices.”87
In England, unlike in France, the Crown was understood in practical ways,
particularly within the realm of “administration and justice,” as opposed to a patriotic
symbol. Specifically, the word Crown generally was used in relation to the royal
demesne. Kantorowicz shows us, though certainly unintended, how Henry II seems to
have separated the objects of the “Crown” as being for the public sphere as opposed to
the references to the King. For example, he cites to the Dialogue of the Exchequer in
1177 where the distinction of property rights derived from the King are set by “what
pertains to the Crown,” as opposed to those who hold from the King a knights fee, not by
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right of the royal Crown, but by that of some barony.”88 This distinction is not universal;
certainly, he shows numerous examples where the nomination King and Crown are used
interchangeably towards the public sphere; yet, his point is that the word Crown does not
get used after Henry II towards the King’s private person.
Similarly, the distinctions between Crown and King begin to show themselves in
legal proceedings. Showing the same distinction in the writings of Glanvill and Bracton
that “the Crown was used for the public sphere and King in the private, Kantorowicz
identifies an interesting phenomenon in the chancery courts. He says:
It was apparently a must to quote both the Crown and royal
dignity in cases entangled with ecclesiastical matters,
whereas it was a may on other occasions. Nothing,
however, could be more wrong than to claim rhetorical
tautology on the part of the chancery which issued the
writs. For while there could be no doubt that all pleas
concerning the competency of either courts Christian or
courts secular were a priori pleas of the Crown, since they
affected the public sphere, the chancery apparently held
that those cases affected also the King’s office or dignity as
King, his sovereignty or “royalty.”89
In a final example of how the “Crown” became distinguished from the man who
wore it, Kantorowicz points us to the Leges Anglorum, an anonymous tract published in
London around 1200. In this fantasiful writing, in which the author seems to imagine the
Kingdom in more Arthurian terms, claims that “by right of the Excellency of the Crown,
[Britain] ought to be called empire rather than Kingdom,” and that the Crown had vast
inalienable rights: ‘the universal and total land and the isles pertain to the Crown,
including even Norway, because on the basis of the Arthurian legend, “Norway had been
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confirmed forever to the Crown of Britain.”90 The author also reminds his readers of
Edward the Confessor’s promise to return all the rights and dignities and lands which his
“predecessors ‘have alienated from the Crown of the realm,’ and to recognize it as his
duty “to observe and defend all the dignities, rights, and liberties of the Crown of this
realm in their wholeness.” 91
Featured another way, Kantorowicz wants us to associate King as to Crown as
tutor is to property of a minor. Thus, the King was the guardian so to speak of the rights
of the non-capacity-holding Crown. And his tutorship was bound into the oaths that
Kings recited before ascending to the throne. For example, Kantorowicz points to the
numerous charges against Richard II for “acting in prejudice of the people and in
disherison of the Crown.”92 Similarly, Henry III charged that Edward I “disinherited the
Crown” by alienating the Isle of Ole’ron, and the magnates charged that Edward II acted
in disherison of the Crown.93 These charges relate specifically to the promises contained
in the sacramental oaths of Kings.94 Moreover, Kantorowicz tells us that, “Kings are
heirs, not of Kings, but of the Kingdom.”95 In this sense, the Crown is perpetually a
minor, and incapable of being disinherited. This valuation is seen in the case King v.
Latimer, where the Court said “the King presented to the aforementioned church, his
aforementioned clerk Robert, as of the right of his Crown which is always so to say, in
the age of a minor and against which in this case, no time runs.”96 The Crown’s minority
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produced a peculiar result: the King was the guardian of the Crown -- as Kantorowicz
says artfully, “for to the perpetual minor, the Crown, there belonged a perpetual adult as
guardian, a King who, like the Crown, never died, was never under age, never sick and
never senile.”97
Finally, the perpetual nature of the King is tied up in the dignity of the King. The
notion of a King’s dignity is particularly difficult when Kings don’t act in a dignified
manner. So to protect the dignity of the Crown from the improprieties of those that wear
the Crown, English Jurists located the virtues of the “King” towards the Crown and not
the fallible man. But, the ethical or moral activities of the King is only one way to
consider his dignity; another is to consider all the vestments of honor that come with
being King. So when Henry IV set aside the lands of the Dutchy of Lancaster to be
governed and held by the King “as though we would never have achieved the height of
royal dignity,” he means to refer to that falling on the natural man a certain ordaining of
higher honor separate from that of natural man.98
But as realist as England was, the notion of dignity was too intangible for English
jurists. So another concept arose that embodied the notions of dignity but also affirmed
the separateness from the natural man -- the body politic. The phrase “body politic”
comes into the English juristic vernacular thanks again to the Dutchy of Lancaster -- or to
be more precise, the Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster. It should be noticed that the judges
refer to the King’s duality as comprised of both a body natural and “a body politic” who
contains his royal estate and dignity royal.”99
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Or consider the case of Hill v. Grange wherein the court calls the name of the
King “the body politic,” a name of “continuance, which shall always endure as the head
and governor of the people as the law presumes, … and in this the King never dies.”
Based on this logic, the court came to the natural conclusion that the King’s death is in
law not called death, but demise,
because thereby he demises the Kingdom to another, and
lets another enjoy the functions, so that the dignity always
continues… And then when … the relation is to him as
King, he as King never dies; but the King in which name it
has relation to him does ever continue, and therefore … the
word King shall extend [from Henry VIII] to King Edward
VI [that is to the successor] … From whence we may see
that when a thing is referred to a particular King by the
name of King, it may extend to his heirs and successors.100
Thus, Coke in Calvin’s case concludes with sufficient authority that “It is true that the
King in genere dieth not, but no question in individuo he dieth.”101
c. Magna Charta: Kings, Crown, Corporation
A cursory look at Magna Charta, the document signed by King John in 1215, and
purporting to guarantee the rights of the Barons against the King would support the
conclusions of both Maitland and Kantorowicz.
First, Magna Charta is a corporate document. That is, the document is signed by
King John, as representative of the dynastic qualities of the Kingship. We see this
primarily in the way Magna Charta refers to the collective “we” in assigning the rights of
the barons. Moreover, the document refers to “our father King Henry” and our brother
King Richard, suggesting both a familial and a collegial relationship of the Kings through
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the years. Yes, King Richard can be the Father, Brother and co-holder of the realm with
John.
This is best understood in the context of a case arguing the meaning of statues
pertaining to the King; Hill v. Grange, a case of trespass against property of the King
addresses the plurality of the King in binding documents.102 The principle issue was
whether the King acted in his personal right or by right of the dignity of the Crown. Had
he operated under dignity of the Crown, his actions were binding on his successors in
interest. The Chief Justice recommended that statutes often bind the fraternity of the
King, even when the King’s name is mentioned in particular: “And the reason is because
the King is a body politic, and when an act says ‘the King,’ or says ‘we’ it is always
spoken in the person of him as King, and in his dignity royal, and therefore it includes all
of those who enjoy his function.”103
Second, Magna Charta, properly read, is a document limiting the rights of the
King from usurping the rights of the Barons by, amongst other things, using the powers
of the Crown. This is most notably seen in the only place where the Crown is specifically
mentioned. In Paragraph twenty-four, the document reads: “No sheriff, constable,
coroners, or others of our bailiffs, shall hold pleas of our Crown.” Or said simply, those
holding offices by virtue of the King, shall not sue in the name of the Crown. This
distinction is quite extraordinary. If read on its face, it would mean that the King, though
he may appoint certain government officials, those officials have no capacity as to the
Crown. This is just one more example of how King and Crown were separate.
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Again, Hill v. Grange is instructive. The court cites to Magna Charta C. 17
“Common Pleas shall not follow our court” to prove that our great charter did not refer to
King John individually, but to the “King as King.”104 Thus, Hill v. Grange provides us a
paradox: the Crown authority used by members of the kingly fraternity who, bind
themselves both naturally and in their dignity to not abuse the authority of the Crown; as
if the dignity would ever seek to abuse its own authority.
Finally, the existence of the document itself suggests a need to reign in, so to
speak, unkingly Kings. That is, not everyone that held the powers of the Crown acted
nobly. As suggested by Kantoriwicz and described above, Richard II or Edward II were
thought to have “blemished the Crown.”105 Thus, Magna Charta stands as an attempt to
remind Kings of their noble office and to limit their human tendencies, at least in regards
to the baron’s property. At the same time, it implicitly recognizes their dynastic qualities:
existing across time, in sempiternity and as a collective body.
***
The features of the body sovereign in England are difficult to distinguish apart
from the representative of sovereignty in England – namely the King. One way of
understanding the body sovereign is to consider its nature as wrapped up in the mystical
dual personality of the King, such as Kantorowicz. Another is to see the King as a living
contradiction as Maitland.

But even Maitland understands that the body of the King

holds sovereignty tight. That is to say, the Kingship serves as the best foremost example
of what a sovereign is, and why sovereignty attaches, no matter how vain those fictions
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may be. It is the conflict of those fictions, and the gradual displacement of the body
sovereign outside the Kingship and towards the people that garners our attention next.

B.
THE BODY AND THE REALM

And therefore at the Kinges Court, my brother, ech man for himself – there is none other.
Geoffrey Chaucer, The Knights Tale from
Canturbury Tales
A people is a group of men united by consent of law and by community of interest. But
such a people does not deserve to be called a Body whilst it is acephalous, that is,
without a head. Because, just as in natural things, what is left over after decapitation is
not a body, but what we call a trunk, so in political things, a community without a head is
not by any means a body.
Sir John Fortescue
On the Governance of England
In the previous chapters, we focused primarily on the King’s personhood, his duality,
dynastic qualities of being incorporated, and how the King “defeats” natural death by
standing in sempiterity. These questions reveal the “myth” of the sovereign’s source of
power and authority -- the nomos of his being. But the question of the King’s
personhood does not answer the central question of how the King relates to his realm.
Indeed, the King’s personhood, being as it were a super-human expression of the natural
life may indeed answer the “why” one asks when seeing the specific ways that the King
relates to his realm. But as with other inquiries the “why” is irrelevant when we don’t
understand the “what.”
Ultimately, the question we posed at the beginning regarding sovereignty can be
reduced to how the sovereign interacts with his people and the narratives told about the
origins of that relationship. One commentator summarized the sovereignty question this
way:

One of the distinguishing features of the seventeenth
century was its effort to work out a theory of sovereignty.
Modern legal positivism never entirely forgot to ask
whether laws were just or unjust, but it much prefers to ask
whether they are clearly binding and enforceable. What
established their power to bind is their origin in an
undoubted authority which, simply because it is the
lawmaking power, is the supreme power on which all
others depend for their validity. Sovereignty is thus its own
validation, not necessarily because it is right but because it
is, by definition the authority from which all others spring.
The central question of political science thus becomes the
location of such power in a community.106
This chapter proposes three ways of locating that power by looking at the King’s
interaction with the realm. The first and most basic way considers the King as
fundamental owner of the realm. Indeed, this view highlights the King’s relationship to
his people as primarily an economic relationship; accordingly, all members of the King’s
realm exist to serve the interests of the King. Thus, in the same way a property owner
expects his land to be economically beneficial, so too the King in this relationship relies
upon the realm. A second view of the Kingship is Sir Robert Filmore’s view of the King
as patriarchal inheritor of regal power. This fatherly King cares for his people as the
people reciprocally enrich their King. The third way of viewing the Kingship’s
relationship to the realm, and arguably the one that was most influential to the American
framers is the Trust. That is, the King indeed holds the realm, but does so for the benefit
of the realm itself and exists for the “common weal.” Implicit in the trust relationship is
the initial grant of authority by the people. Principally, this section will deal with the
manifestations of the trust by Sir John Fortescue, John Locke, and William Blackstone.
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All three theoretical frameworks depend on a normative narrative. Each theory
discussed in this section weaves a theory of the Kingship into a theory of humanity and of
political society. Filmer and Locke in rebuttal to each other spend more time defining the
way that creation and human existence determine a theory of Kingship. Alternatively,
Blackstone’s and Foresque’s narratives are more strongly tied to a context-specific
history of the Kingship; Blackstone in particularly has something very interesting to say
in light of revolts and revolutions that tended to define the sovereign. (Can there be a
more descriptive way of defining a sovereign’s relation to his realm than to highlight
when some of his people claim he has breached the limits of his rule?) This work, a
polemic, understands the philosophical contrivances of the Kingship as built upon
narratives and norms as rehearsed by specific authors at specific times. This work’s value
is its recognition that the normative location of “beginnings” (both as norm and narrative)
is an imperative towards understanding sovereignty. Succinctly, this section more than
any other tries to make sense of something that is not necessarily coherent: a theological
value-set that is challenged by the historical framework, that is shaped by its authors to
create a new narrative, and that ultimately works out sovereignty in the terms of the
narrative.
a.

The King as Conquering Landlord
The description of the King as landlord is quite simple in terms of his relation to real

property in England. Indeed, Arthur Hogue carefully turned our eyes to the relation of
socage and burgage tenures to the aspect of kingly sovereignty.107 The legal mark
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imprinted on the English countryside (literally) by the Norman Kings was characterized
by tenures derived ultimately from the King himself. As Hogue aptly says, In England,
the King was “supreme landlord over the realm.”108 But though the image of King as
“supreme landlord” is helpful for understanding the way property rights devolve, it does
not explain per se how the people relate to the King outside of the property relationship,
though it may illuminate a distinct aspect of the King’s relationship to his people.
What it does provide is the image of the conqueror as possessor. Image may indeed
be all we have. As the English historian Charles Howard McIlwain has written, the
sources following the conquest until the reign of Henry I are “slight, scattered, and rather
inconclusive.”109 Yet the image itself is certainly telling. Certainly, the power that
King’s had to rule stemmed directly from the first “Conqueror” and extended only as
King’s maintained the power to rule in the Norman’s image. Indeed, from the time of
the conquest till the thirteenth century, the auspices of English law appear similar to the
“coutumes of northern France,” as opposed to the cultural traditions of the Anglo Saxon
predecessors in possession of the English Crown.110 Even the source of authority being
traced to someone called “the conqueror” speaks to the normative view of those that
follow in the conqueror’s place. Implicit is the recognition that with a conqueror comes
new law, new order, and new loyalty.

production upon the land of a lord. Burgage are more nuanced, and relate to status within
the realm rather than effects upon the land.
108
Id.
109
CHARLES I. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 70 (1940).
110
F.W. Mailtland, History of England in F. W. MAITLAND, HISTORICAL ESSAYS 97, 101
(1938). Namely Maitland means the vernacular of law and customs traditionally
associated with the English form of law, but which have no source in Anglo Saxon
tradition. i.e. trial by jury. Id.

That image was one that capitalized on the station of “King” towards erecting
beneficial structures for the collection of taxes and fees. For example, the compilation of
the Doomsday Book, an attempt to systemize the payments of fees to predecessor’s in
title emphasized the connection between land, duty, and King.111 Indeed, the innovation
of the Norman Conquest was to divorce the King from the feudal tenures that so bound
the French King. Now the King stood with no other person in his realm above him.
Thus, the sheriffs were the King’s officers, the court’s the King’s courts, and accordingly
all the people owed their ultimate allegiance to him and him only; only subsidarily to
their lords.112

The conquering King was one way to understand the King’s relation to

the people; as conqueror, he was entitled to not only their loyalties but their treasures as
well.
But the image that the Norman conquest brings is not just a pyramidal description of
ultimate power. This question returns us to a consideration we breezed by in the last part
– that of the King’s corporational character.113 So that our formulation of the King is
clear at this point, we suggest that the corporational model of the Kingship includes
members of the royal dynasty together with his subjects in the realm, along with his
predecessors and successors to the Crown. In Norman England, the King was indeed the
realm. That image survived through successive generations.
111
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Id. Maitland makes this point well emphasizing William’s personal knowledge of the
fallacies of the French system, himself being the “rebellious vassal” of the French King.
Id.
113
Indeed, though we answered what aspects of a corporation the king tends to resemble,
we ignored purposefully his posture within the corporation. Instead, in our last chapter,
we only talked about the temporal aspects of the corporate character, that the king is
incorporated through time with his brethren monarchs holding the realm as a dynasty.
This section looks principally at the second group comprising the King’s corporation –
his realm.
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Two cases highlight this view of the King. The first, Willion v. Berkely,114 is often
cited for its compelling language that supports the Kings two bodies. In Willion, Henry
Willion brought suit for trespass and damages against Henry Berkley and Richard
Knight, who entered the manor of Weston possessed by Willion and ejected him by
“force of arms, viz., swords, staves and knives.”115 Both Berkley and Willion claimed
seven acres of land attached to the Weston Mannor by rightful claim. During the reign of
Henry VII, the property was given to William Marquess Berkley for life, with a fee tail to
Henry VII. The property transfer also contained a condition that if Henry VII died
without male heirs, then the property would revert to the next heir of the William
Marquess Berkley.116 Edward VI indeed died without male issue and Berkley claimed
the chain of property proceeded as follows: Henry VII –William Marquess Berkley –
Henry VII – Henry VIII – Edward VI – Next heir of the Marquess Berkley, namely
Henry Berkley.
Willion, on the other hand claimed possession of the land through the grant of a third
party, Henry Cook, who claimed rightful ownership of the property by virtue of a second
grant by Henry VIII. Succinctly, Willion agreed that property reverted back to Henry VII
upon the death of the Marquess, and that title then passed to Henry VIII. However,
Willion claimed that Henry VIII then deeded the land in fee simple to Lady Catherine, his
first wife, thereby breaking the reversionary right in the King. Thus Willion’s chain of
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title looked so: Henry VII – William Marquess Berkley – Henry VII – Henry VIII – Fee
simple to Lady Catherine Latimer – Henry Cock, lessee of Henry Willion.117
Importantly, the litigants and the justices did not perceive this case to be simply a
question of instruments and heirs. Rather it was a question that touched the metaphysical
nature of the King, and how the King relates to his realm. Like the conqueror, who
related to the realm as possessor, the court saw this issue as touching the very narrative of
the King, not just a technical question of reversions. For example, one exception raised
by Defendants was the King Henry VIII did not have the capacity to deed the property to
Catherine. The court then recited the traditional mystical view of the King and his natural
body: “[a]nd as to this, it was argued on this side that the King has two capacities, for he
has two bodies, the one whereof is a body natural, consisting of natural members as every
other man has, and in this he is subject to passions and to death as other men are.”118 But
then, in describing the mystical political body, the court citing Lord Southcote
incorporates the realm as bound together by the King: “[t]he other is a body politik, and
the members thereof are his subjects, and he and his Subjects together compose the
corporation… and he is incorporated with them, and they with him, and he is the head
and they are the members, and he has the sole government of them… “119 The idea
expressed in Willion v. Berkely is simply that the King and realm form a body inseparable
by the death of the King.120 As King, the head of the Body, he has full capacity to control
and govern the members held up in his body.
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But Willion v. Berkley suggests more than just the headship of the King over the
corporate body of the realm; it also suggests a comity between King and realm. The
court describes the reciprocal relationship in relation to an exception taken on the basis of
an act presumed only to apply to certain members of the realm. The court in ruling that
the statute was a general act and thereby universally applicable, discussed the reciprocal
nature of the realm to the King:
For every subject has an interest in the King, and none of
his subjects that is within his law is divided from the King,
who is his head and sovereign. So that his business and
things concerns the whole realm; and forasmuch as the
whole realm has an interest in the King and by the same
reason in the queen who is his wife, the said act is concerns
the whole realm…121
Ultimately, Willion’s argument fails. The Court, distinguishes the rights of Henry
VIII as regent from Henry as natural person. Justice Brown says:
For the King naturally, properly, and fully cannot purchase
by any other name than by the name of King, for the name
of King has drowned his surname, and in the name of King,
his surname and proper name also are included…. So that
the name of the Lord the King contains the King in certain
viz, the King which then in, or the King spoken of. And
although it is usual at this day to say King Henry 8, or King
Edward 3, or King Edward 4 this is but for distinctions
sake, to know what King we mean…. For the word King is
a name of substance by itself without the name of
baptism…. And if land is given to Edward 6 or Henry 8
omitting the word King, they shall take nothing. But contra
if a patent is made by King Henry 8 by the words “the King
hath granted, omitting Henry…the gift is good….So that if
said) the Death of the King, but the demise of the King, not signifying by the word
(Demise) that the body politic of the King is dead, but that there is a separation of the two
bodies , ad that the Body politic is transferred and conveyed over from the Body natural
now dead , or now removed from the dignity royal to another body natural. So that it
signifies the removal of the body politic of the King of this realm from one Body natural
to another. Id. at 235.
121
Id. at 230.

land is given to a King by the name of baptism and by the
name of King also, .. this shall go in succession as the
Crown shall go. 122
By holding land in his mystical body, it meant that the King had an interest in that land
through time. It further meant that the mystical elements of the King became
incorporated into the things he touched – his property. But the King’s metaphysical
character did not just control his property but his subjects as well, as discussed one year
later.
Hales v. Petit was an action for trespass by Margaret Hales, plaintiff against
Cyriack Petit. Margaret Hales, with her Husband James Hales owned the land in fee
simple. But James Hales “voluntarily and feloniously” drowned himself leaving only
widowed Margaret Hales.123 Upon the death of Mr. Hales, the Archbishop re-leased the
lands to Defendant, Cyriack Petit for a new term of years. The ultimate question was
whether by virtue of Hale’s suicide was the land he and his heirs had title to, now
escheated to the state. The Court ruled it was.
Hale’s “homicide” is characterized as an offense against, God, nature and King.124
Pertinently to the King, the Court says that Hale’s suicide was an offence,
Against the King in that hereby he has lost a subject, and
(as Brown termed it) he being the Head has lost one of his
mystical members. Also he has offended the King in
giving such an example to his subjects, and it belongs to the
King, who has the Government of the People, to take care
that no evil Example be given them, and an evil Example is
an offense against Him.125
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Implicit is the orientation of the court towards viewing the subject, as not just static
members of the King’s body, but as productive members that benefit the King in his body
politic. So, the court terms the offense not as a moral offense for the sake of being
immoral, but rather as a deprivation of a principle part of the King’s realm – one of his
persons.
Hales v. Petit and Willion v. Berkely demonstrate how the laws related the King’s
interest in his “political body.” Interestingly, in both cases the treatment of individuals
and property held by the “King’s body” is symmetrical. Henry of York (Henry VIII) has
no more right to deprive himself, or Edward VI for that matter, of property than James
Hales can deprive the King of a life. They confirm the image of a conquering King that
by virtue of his victory is entitled to the revenues of his body, regardless of the decisions
natural persons make. The “beginnings” that are honored are an economic relationship
that began in the conquest, that entitled the King as King to certain property, as well as
the lives of his subjects. They confirm a merger on certain levels of subjects as property.
b.

King as Father
A similar metaphor to support the divine right of the King to rule appears in the

late seventeenth century when Sir Robert Filmer published his Patriarcha, a narrative of
the Kingship as Father, inheritor, and provider of the realm.126 In looking at Filmer, it is
important to ground his work in both the historical moments surrounding him, and his
own conception of “what he was trying to say.” Historically, Patriarcha was composed
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ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS (1680) available at
http://www.constitution.org/eng/patriarcha.htm

in 1628 and published posthumously in 1680 as Tory propaganda.127 Importantly, the
events that Filmer has in mind when he writes Patriarcha are not the ones that
immediately are associated with Filmer’s political rhetoric; in Filmer’s mind are the
reigns of Richard II and Edward II which ended in civil war and the death of both Kings.
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See JAMES DALY, SIRE ROBERT FILMER AND ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 9 (1979).
Patriarcha went through several editions starting in 1680. Daly seems to rebuff the
influence that Filmer may have had on Tory political philosophy, suggesting that other
royalist paths besides Filmer’s provided the basic line of discussion. See id. at 11. On
the other hand, Filmer was deemed a voice to be answered by the Whigs, who “dealt
Filmer punishing blows” from his lengthy excursion on the book of Genesis and his
general natural theology of the King as father. Id. Among those that offered rebuffs to
Filmer’s thought are Algernon Sidney, who described Patriarcha as “grounded on
wicked principles equally pernicious to magistrates and people” (see Algernon Sidney,
Colonel Sidney’s Speech Delivered to the Sheriff on the Scaffold, (Dec. 7, 1683)), and
John Locke, whose first part of Two Treatises of Government is solely dedicated to
rebuffing the thought of Robert Filmer. Sidney also produced a longer, more copious
work that spent considerable time debasing the political order of Filmer. See Algernon
Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, (1702).
Notably, Filmer was not without his supporters. A defense of Filmer was taken
up by Edmund Bohun specifically relating to the attacks by Sidney in his Speech on the
Scaffold. Specifically, the author performs a line-by-line exegesis of Sidney’s speech,
trying to demonstrate the speech as a “unseasonable and unbecoming declamation.” See
Edmund Bohun, A Defense of Sir Robert Filmer, Against the Mistakes and
Misrepresentations of Algernon Sidney Esq. in a Paper Delivered by him to the Sheriffs
upon the Scaffold on Tower-Hill, on Friday December the 7th 1683 before his execution
there 2 (1684) (Hereinafter Defense). One passage from Bohun’s writings seem to
capture the ideological and religious nature of this tension:
Tho’ the season of the year, the infirmities of this age, increased by
[Sidney’s] close imprisonment of about five months, might be allowed as
reasonable causes why he should not speak much at his execution; yet in
my poor judgment, they will afford him little excuse either for what he
hath or what he hath not delivered in writing, since he was pleased to take
that way: For it had been as easy, and much more becoming a Christian, a
Subject, and a Martyr, as he seems desirous to be thought, to have told the
world whether he were guilty, or not, or of the things laid to his charge,
than to Arraign his Judges, to have Exhorted the people to Loyalty and
Obedience towards their gracious King, and to have prayed for the peace
and prosperity of his Prince and his Country, as to complain of the Age,
and yet at the same time endeavor to make it worse by an unseasonable
and unbecoming declamation.
Id.

He probably sees parallels between the public response to both prior Kings and the
current King Charles I, whose unpopularity amongst the noble class was growing.128
Notably, he does not have in mind at this time the dissolution of Parliament in 1629 by
Charles I,129 the Long and Short Parliaments of 1640,130 the Ship Money crisis131 and the
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Charles was given the benefit of the doubt at least early on in his reign. One
commentator has noted that most parliamentary objections were aimed at Lord
Buckingham and the King’s advisors for “misleading” a “helpless monarch.” DAVID
UNDERDOWN, A FREEBORN PEOPLE: POLITICS AND THE NATION IN SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND 39 (1996). Indeed, the theology of the Kingship dictated that “the
king could do no wrong.” As Sir John Eliot said to the House of Commons, “ ‘no act of
the King can make him unworthy of his Kingdom;’ such an idea would be ‘against our
religion.’” See William B. Bidwell and Maija Jansson, eds, PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT
1626 III, 358 (1991) citied in Underdown, supra at 133. However, this perception of a
“helpless monarch” would not last as the ultimate trial and regicide of Charles I would
show.
129
In 1629 Charles I dissolved the Parliament session in large measure deeming
Parliament’s approval as unnecessary to collect various taxes for the continuation of wars
against Spain, France, and Scotland. In the midst of this dispute the sovereignty of the
King arose in the curious form of legal recognition as opposed to regal tradition. Charles
McIlwain reports that when the Petition of Rights, which would require Parliament’s
approval of taxes before collection, came before the House of Lords, they sought to add a
clause “saving the sovereign power of the King.” Notably, the Commons understood that
to allow such an addition would be to recognize not only a regal right by a legal right.
John Pym said that “All our Petition is for the laws of England, and this power seems to
be another distinct Power from the Power of the law: I know how to add Sovereign to his
person, but not to his power: And we cannot leave to him a sovereign power…” See
CHARLES MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 83 (1979).
It would seem that at least by 1628, questions relating to the location of the sovereign
were being raised by the House of Commons.
Initially, Charles was hesitant to consent to the Petition of Right, but after
consultation, he was informed that it could have no binding force against him. After
signing the Petition, he levied taxes, and then dissolved Parliament for eleven years.
130
Having no Parliamentary session since 1929, Charles I, needed more revenue to
continue his wars, specifically against Scotland. Accordingly, he recalled Parliament on
April 13, 1640. At that time, many members of Parliament challenged the legality of the
prior dissolution and John Pym spoke forcefully for two hours against the acts of the
King. Three weeks later, on May 5, 1640, Charles again dissolved the Parliament
believing the political tension insurmountable.
Several months later, on November 3, 1640 Charles convened what is known as
the Long Parliament which did not formally dissolve until May 16, 1660.

accompanying losses in the Bishops Wars with Scotland, the trial and ultimate regicide of
Charles I,132 the assumption by the Lord Protector of the Common Wealth, or the return
to the throne of Charles II. Notably, Patriarcha’s ultimate publication came thirty-one
years after the regicide of Charles I, and eight years before the abdication of Charles II,
known as the Glorious revolution; thus though FIlmer may have been spared this
knowledge, his reader would certainly recall these events in parsing Filmer’s rhetoric. A
primary question these issues spurred was the nature of the King’s power and authority,
making Patriarcha an interesting solution to a King’s usurpation of power.133 Filmer
sets out to answer the central question: can liberty be a natural right. Filmer’s work
answers that question most pertinently in relation to the King.134
Ultimately, Filmer’s theological lens informs his view of human history. That is,
the “beginnings” for Filmer are normatively tied to the authenticity and meaning behind
the biblical story; the necessity for modeling the timeless structures present in the biblical
131

“Ship money” was a means of Royal Taxation upon local governments done to raise
money for armed naval vessels. The tradition of “Ship Money” dates back to early
medieval times when Kings would raise money for armies and navies through local
barons. For a more detailed discussion of Ship Money, and its implications in the
Seventeenth Century, see Stewart Jay, Servants of Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory
Role of Early English Advisors and Judges, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 141-43 (1994);
see also UNDERDOWN, supra note 133, at 43 (suggesting that Ship Money never really
became an issue until the Hampden Case in 1637 where, instead of receiving
Parliamentary advice, King Charles utilized the advice of his own judges).
132
See Sarah Barber, Charles I: Regicide and Republicanism, 1996 HIST. TODAY 29, AT
31 (“the tragedy of Charles I: in 1649 the new rulers of England, holding their positions
by virtue of conquest over the anointed symbol of divine power on Earth, chose to make
the most public and graphic display of the way in which the person of the monarch could
be separated from the sovereignty he was meant to express.”). This point was made clear
by an announcement of the establishment of a new political order in a publication called
the Moderate: “The Corpse of the King was sent to Windsor, to be buried in St. George’s
Chappel.” As one commentator noted “ the point was clear: not only was the King dead,
but the kingly office as well.” See Amos Tubb, Printing the Regicide of Charles I at 517.
133
See Daly, supra note 132, at 4.
134
Id.

narrative thus becomes a fulfillment of normative values. So for Filmer, Adam was not
just a person given “economic power” in the garden, but a person vested with political
power over the world as father of the world.135 According to Filmer, civil power flows
by “divine institution.”136 The divine institution that Filmer refers to is Adam’s election
as the first human in creation and the powers that derived from his estate.137 Thus,
Filmer’s model understands Kingship as deriving power from beginnings. Succinctly,
there is significance in being the first. For Filmer, the description of King as Patriarch or
Pater Patriae affirms the nature of beginnings inherent in Kingship.
And fatherhood carries a mystical quality about who should be King. King’s,
though not the natural parents of their citizens, are the mystical parents, holding their
children within their reign. Kings are not chosen by human hands but by the mysteries of
“first birth.”138 The picture that Filmer has in mind is the King’s receipt of power directly
from God himself:
All such prime heads and fathers have power to consent in
the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign
authority on whom they please; and he that is so elected
135

Filmer, supra note 131, at 4 (“I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man
else, can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subjection of children being
the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself.”).
136
Id. at 4 (“it follows that civil power not only in general is by divine institution, but
even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents, which quite takes away that
new and common distinction which refers only power universal and absolute to God, but
power respective in regard of the special form of government to the choice of the people.
137
Filmer refers to Adam’s lordship, which descended to the patriarchs as being as “large
and ample as any dominion of any monarch” Id. at 4. That dominion included the power
to decree a death sentence (see Judah’s pronouncement of a death sentence to Thamar,
Gen. 38); power to war and command armies (see Abraham’s commanding of an army,
Gen. 12); power to make peace with other nations (see Abraham declaring peace with
Abemilech, Gen. 20). He summarizes thus: “These acts of judging in Capital Crimes, of
making war, and concluding peace, are the chiefest marks of ‘sovereignty’ that are found
in any monarch.” Filmer, supra note 131 at 5.
138
Id. at 6.

claims not his power as donative from people, but as being
substituted properly by God from whom he receives his
Royal Charter of an Universal father, though testified by
the ministry of the heads of the people.”139
Two ideas are gestating here for Filmer: first, just like the King received from God the
Royal Charter, he may place upon his own heir the royal charter, subject of course to the
hand of God, which ultimately chooses the heir. Second, the “ministry of the heads of
people” includes the act of ministering to the King; it confirms the people’s submission
to, not authority over the body of the King.
The first idea posed by Filmer – that Kings receive their grant directly from God
and therefore may grant royal authority to their own heirs – captures the nature of the
royal grant. His heirs are considered the “next heirs to those first progenitors who were
at first natural parents of the whole people, and in their right succeed to the exercise of
supreme jurisdiction. And such heirs are not only lords of their own children but also of
their brethren, and all others that were subject to their fathers.” 140 Indeed, as discussed in
Part II, the mystical continuation of the King’s corporation, is reflected in Filmer’s view
of primogeniture and the ascent of new Kings.141
This does not mean that the forceful removal of Kings does not occur or is not
ordained. Indeed, Filmer has to make sense of the falls of Richard II and Edward II from
Royal power. What Filmer makes clear is that this removal from power is not because of
the people’s will but solely from God.
139

Id.
Id. at. 7-8.
141
Id. at 7 (“as long as the first fathers of families lived, the name of the patriarchs did
aptly belong unto them; but after a few descents, when the true fatherhood itself was
extinct, and only the right of the father descends to the true heir, then the title of prince of
King was more significant to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of
that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy.”).
140

“If it please God, for the correction of the prince or
punishment of the people, to suffer princes to be removed
and others to be placed in their rooms, either by the factions
of the nobility or rebellion of the people, in all such cases,
the judgment of God, who hath power to give and to take
away kingdoms, is most just; yet the ministry of men who
execute God’s judgments without commission is sinful and
damnable. God doth but use and turn men’s unrighteous
acts to the performance of His righteous decrees.”142
Said more directly, Kings fall because of the need to discipline the King, or to discipline
the people, or both.
Specifically in England’s case, Filmer notes that the Kingdom has never truly
suffered under a tyrant. “Edward II and Richard II were not insupportable either in their
nature or rule.”143 Rather, it was the wickedness of the people that led to both
insurrections; the result was the “miserable wast[ing]” of the Kingdom by civil war,
which only affirmed the nature of the Britain’s to the world:
These three unnatural wards have dishounoured our nation
amongst strangers, so that in the censures of Kingdoms the
King of Spain is said to be the King of Men, because of his
subject’s willing obedience; the King of France, King of
Asses, because of their infinite taxes and impositions; but
the King of England is said to be the King of devils,
because of his subjects often insurrections against and
depositions of their princes.144
But most supporting Filmer’s point that deposition is brought about because of the need
for discipline is the successor reign of Henry. Quoting the Historian known as
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Id. at 7.
Id. at 23. Indeed, Filmer says “Edward II by many historians is reported to be of a
good and virtuous nature, and not unlearned;” his misfortune being a result of “fortune”
rather than despotic rule. Likewise, Richard II was deposed by a “tempestuous rage,
neither led nor restrained by any rules of reason or state.” Id.
144
Id. at 23-24.
143

Hollingshed, Filmer shows how the deposition of Richard II led to the people’s longsuffering at the hands of his replacement:
That he was most unthankfully used by his subjects; for
although, through the frailty of his youth he demeaned
himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty
of his estate, yet in no King’s days were the commons in
greater wealth, the nobility more honoured, and the clergy
less wronged, who notwithstanding, in the evil-guided
strength of their will, took head against him, to their own
headlong destruction afterwards, partly during the reign of
Henry, his successor, who greatest achievements were
against his own people in executing those who conspired
with him against King Richard. But more especially is
succeeding times when, upon occasion of this disorder,
more English blood was spent than was in all the foreign
wars together which have been since the Conquest.
Filmer’s point is simple; a deviled people deserve a deviled King.145
Filmer’s second point is social: the ministry of the people Filmer understands as
containing a distinct economic authority. Adam was not only first father, but also first
possessor, first caretaker, first economic provider. Filmer, therefore, sees the “political
fatherhood” in a reciprocal relationship to his children. The King extends his care over
the many families to “preserve, feed, clothe, instruct, and defend the whole” family. But
the King also may extract the “bounties” of his people.146 Filmer’s reading of the prophet
Samuel’s admonition of Kingship147 demonstrates this:
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Filmer’s notion of cosmic justice -- that good peoples get good kings, while bad
people get tyrants – was a well documented theory in the early middle ages that explained
why people suffer under tyrannical leaders. See e.g., John of Salisbury, Policraticus, in
O’DONOVAN & O’DONOVAN, FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 283 (1999) (describing the Bishop of Rome’s “welcoming” Attila
the Hun, “the Scourge of God” ).
146
Filmer supra note 131 at 8.
147
I Samuel 8:10-18 (NIV):
Samuel told all the words of the LORD to the people who
were asking him for a king. He said, "This is what the king

it is evidently shown that the scope of Samuel was to teach
the people a dutiful obedience to their King, even in those
things which themselves did esteem mischievous and
inconvenient; for by telling them what a King would do he,
indeed, instructs them what a subject must suffer, yet not so
that it is right for Kings to do injury, but it is right for them
to go unpunished by the people if they do it. So that in this
point it is all one whether Samuel describe a King or a
tyrant, for patient obedience is due to both; no remedy in
the text against tyrants, but in crying and praying unto God
in that day. But howsoever in a rigorous construction
Samuel’s description be applied to a tyrant, yet the words
by a benign interpretation may agree with the manners of a
just King, and the scope and coherence of the text doth best
imply the more moderate or qualified sense of the words.148
Filmer supposes that Samuel’s discursion on Kingship is not about tyrants or good Kings;
its rather neutral towards the moral culpability of Kings. Rather, the passage is about
what the people can expect from their King.
One such expectation towards the Kingship is that the people’s economic interests
are subordinate to the King’s. First, the people can expect a tenth of their “seed, of their
vines, and of their sheep” to be taken by the King as a right of tribute. Second, the taking
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who will reign over you will do: He will take your sons and
make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will
run in front of his chariots. Some he will assign to be
commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and
others to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still
others to make weapons of war and equipment for his
chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and
cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and
vineyards and olive groves and give them to his attendants.
He will take a tenth of your grain and of your vintage and
give it to his officials and attendants. Your menservants and
maidservants and the best of your cattle and donkeys he
will take for his own use. He will take a tenth of your
flocks, and you yourselves will become his slaves. When
that day comes, you will cry out for relief from the king
you have chosen, and the LORD will not answer you in that
day."
Id. at 25.

of such things may be by force when necessary to erect the Kingdom, “for those who will
have a King are bound to allow him royal maintenance by providing revenues for the
Crown, since it is both for the honour, profit, and safety, too, of the people to have their
King glorious, powerful, and abounding in riches.”149 Thus, Filmer’s conception of the
Kingship includes one that is owed tributes and who may, if necessary, seize the
economic engines of his people for the benefit of the people.
Importantly, Filmer finds normative proof that the King as Father is justified as a
natural theory. That theory like the Conqueror\Landlord model combines the economic
and political capacities of the Kingship together. It establishes that there is a mystically
ordained King, who passes his line like a father passes the family estate to his eldest son.
And though the King should protect his people like a father protects his children, no one
has the authority to correct the King when he fails to do so, or when he unjustly usurps
the people.
Whether the image that endures is the traditional view of the conqueror, the
baronial landlord, or the pater patriae the same end is reached by the discussion
suggested in this part: the King is the supreme person stationed above the rest; he is
entitled to political power, which includes the economic resources of the people. There is
no separation in King and Common; both Court and Cottage are conjoined together
irrevocably to serve one another; cottage towards maintaining the honours of Kings and
Court towards representing the justice of God for the people. The next section considers
alternative images of a slightly restrained King.
c.
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The King as Holder of the Corpus’s Trust

Id.

The formulation that begins to take shape in the seventeenth century actually began
formulation in the fifteenth century. Various revolts showed the theory was believable:
people started thinking that sovereignty may actually originate in the people, who then
grant the power to rule to their leaders, Kings etc… The normative analogy that I wish to
set forth here is that of a trust between King and public. Specifically three formulations
of that trust are discussed. The earliest is John Fortescue’s binding of the King to the law
in the name of the public good. The second, by John Locke, builds on Fortescue’s notion
that law binds Kings, but offers a remedy to despotic Kings. The third, by William
Blackstone, mitigates Fortescue and Locke. In all three, narratives of beginnings
formulate the theory.

1. Sir. John Fortescue of Governance of England are of the Laws of England
The earliest formulation of a “trust relationship” is raised by Sir John Fortescue, who
believed that the public served to benefit the King economically while the King offered
his protection and justice. But these reciprocal actions were not contractual. There was
no bargain, per se, that the King reached with his people to assume an elevated station.
Rather, they were simply duties attached to the station each assumed within the social
strata of the realm.
So, for example, when Fortescue describes the reason for this social order, he looks
specifically to the economic duty of the people to not just support the King, but to do so
abundantly. For “if a King is poor, he shall by necessity make his expenses and buy all
that is necessary to his estate, by credit and borrowing; wherefore his creditors will win

upon him the fourth or the fifth penny of all that he spends … What dishonor this is, and
abating of the glory of a King.”150
Fortiscue’s concern is as much towards a stable social government as it is towards the
“glory of a King.” Fortescue’s theory of Kingship infers that Kingship arises in two
distinct forms – dominium regale and dominium politicum et regale; England is
represented by the later while France the former.151 The narrative that Fortescue gives is
a juxtaposition between the Biblical pagan King Nimrod and the more civilized and wise
King of the Britains’ Brutas.152 The distinction for Fortescue solely revolves around the
aim of the government. For Nimrod and his progeny, the King governed solely by his
own will, and arose from the might of the conquering prince. The latter, on the other
hand began as a cognitive act of the people and their vesting in the person and line of the
King a power to rule over them justly.
And in this sense, Fortescue makes clear that “the head does not swallow the body,”
but rather each exist with their own areas of supremacy.153 Specifically, his King that
rules by both Royal and political means specifically subjects himself to the laws of the
land that he rules over. “For the King of England is not able to change the laws of his
Kingdom at pleasure...”154 Unlike the civil laws of the continent which holds the pleasure
of the prince as the “force of law,” England has chosen to restrain its King from the
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SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 92 (Shelly Lockwood, ed.
1996)..
151
Id. at. 87 (“Although the French King reigns upon his people ‘by royal dominion,’ yet
neither Saint Louis, sometime King there, nor any of his progenitors, ever set any tax or
other imposition upon the people of that land without the assent of the three estates.
152
Id. at 85-86.
153
Kantorowicz, supra note 37, at 231.
154
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (Shelly Lockwood, ed. 1996).

power of his own prerogative.155 Indeed, restraining the King politically is the only
means of protecting the realm from the rule of a tyrant.156
Were we tempted to stop here in Fortescue’s political theory, then we might begin to
equate his theory with Locke’s social contract; indeed, Locke even perceived Fortescue
as suggesting that a prince may forfeit his power to the “obedience of his subjects.”157
But Fortescue wants to make clear that political communities require Kings. Quoting
from Augustine’s City of God and Aristotle’s Politics, he describes the difference
between a body with and without a head:
Sainte Augustine, in the nineteenth book of the City of
God, Chapter 23, said that “a people is a group of men
united by consent of law and by community of interest.”
But such a people does not deserve to be called a Body
whilst it is acephalous, that is, without a head. Because,
just as in natural things, what is left over after decapitation
is not a body, but what we call a trunk, so in political
things, a community without a head is not by any means a
body. Hence Aristotle in the first book of the Politics said
that “whensoever one body is constituted out of many, one
will rule, and the others will be ruled.”158
For Fortescue, removal of a sovereign is not the answer to a tyrant; rather a more forceful
restraining of the King by the laws is the proper answer. Continuing his metaphor of the
body and the head, Fortescue says that the law restrains a King like tendons serve as
connectors in the human body:
The law, indeed, by which a group of men is made into a
people resembles the sinews [tendons] of the physical
155

Id.
Id. at 26.
157
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 207 (Yale University Press 2003)
(aligning Fortesque, Bracton, and “the author of the Mirror”). We shall endeavor more
deeply into Locke’s social contract theory in Subpart “c -- the King as Obligee” to this
Chapter.
158
Laws, supra note 159, at 20.
156

body, for just as the body is held together by the [tendons],
so this body mystical is bound together and preserved as
one by the law, which is derived from the word “binding,”
and the members and bones of this body, which signify the
solid basis of truth by which the community is sustained,
preserve their rights through the law, as the body natural
does through the [tendons]. And just as the head of the
physical body is unable to change its sinews, or to deny its
members proper strength and due nourishment of blood, so
a King who is head of the body politic is unable to change
the laws of that body or to deprive that same people of their
own substance uninvited or against their wills.159
Fortescue accomplishes the combination of a political theory that originates sovereignty
in the people with the learned experience of having a King who holds that sovereignty to
the exclusion of all others. In certain measure, this is the accomplishment of all the
theorists discussed herein, and so Fortescue is not necessarily remarkable in that fashion.
He is remarkable for his ability to separate what he perceives to be the “political origins
of the Kingship” from the mystical qualities that the King inherits when he assumes the
throne. Thus, Fortescue is perfectly happy to attribute to the King all the qualities
discussed in the first part of this paper (The Gemina Persona) if you understand that the
starting place for the King’s power begins as an investment by the people and is limited
by the expression of the people through law. Foremost, though Fortescue’s trust is built
on the presence of a wise King that honors the law – just like Brutas.
2.

John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government

Locke’s beginnings, like Filmer, start in creation: the very beginnings of the
natural world that endow humans with certain qualities, rights, and duties towards each
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Id. at 21.

other. 160 “To understand political power right,” we are told by Locke,” and derive it from
its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man.”161 That state was the state at creation.
Locke’s narrative of creation is rather matter of fact. “[Adam] was created, or
began to exist, by God’s immediate power, without the intervention of parents, or the preexistence of the same species to beget him, when it please God he should.” Adam was
created like the beasts of the field.”162 In creation, he was vested with a general authority
over the beasts of the earth, not singularly, but as representative of the grant to all
mankind: “it was not to Adam in particular.”163 Additionally, there is nothing in the
biblical text that would recommend that Adam was granted similar authority over
mankind.164 Adam (and Noah) receive on behalf of mankind, the general suppositions of
nature, not as any privilege or elevation of position, but simply because they were
there.165 Most notably, the role of creator does not pass to Adam from God in the
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Locke interprets Filmer’s theory as establishing four primary justifications for
Monarchy through Adam: creation, donation, subjection of Eve, and Fatherhood. This
work will not attempt to parse each of those themes, but rather try to string together
Locke’s affirmative theory of beginnings.
161
Locke, supra note 162, at 101.
162
Id. at 14-15
163
Id. at 20-21.
164
Id. at 20-22. Locke chastises Filmer’s theory by suggesting that Filmer’s norm of
Monarch would entitle Kings to dine upon the flesh of their subjects, being in subjection
to Monarchs in the same way that beasts are subjected to him. Id. at 22 (“methinks Sir
Robert should have carried his Monarchical power one step higher, and satisfied the
world that Princes might eat their subjects too, since God gave full power to Noah and his
heirs to eat ‘every living thing that moveth,’ as he did to Adam to have dominion over
them.”).
165
Id. at 32-33.

creation; rather God remains the sovereign creator, with Adam simply being the first of
his workmanship.166
Because Adam gains no preeminence over others by being first, neither do other
men have such a claim to privilege. In that way, nature informs mankind that “being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
possessions…” Mankind exists as “servants” of “one sovereign master;” “they are his
property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not another’s, pleasure:
and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there
cannot be supposed any subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy another,
as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.”
From this initial state of creation / nature, man comes together to form political
societies.167 Though he does not tell us precisely how man comes together (i.e. he does
not give us a meeting hall or general election theory) he does tell us why: “we are
naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others;”168 and to avoid states
of war.169 In doing so, man reorders his interaction with humanity and the natural world
“by their own consents,” making themselves into a “political society,” and thereby comes
to agreements regarding crime, family, war, and most importantly property, money, and
exchange. Thus, “God, having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment it was
not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience,
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and inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and
language to continue and enjoy it.”170
That reordering occurs by the common agreement of transgressions that are
worthy of punishment (the making of laws) as well as the authority to execute those laws
against transgressors (what Locke calls the power of war and peace).171 Importantly,
Locke identifies the three primary functions that our Western tradition has embraced as
the powers of government; the determination of norms (legislative); the determination of
specific violation of those norms (magisterial); and the enforcement and execution of
those norms (executive).172

Importantly, the reordering occurs when man, in political

community, agrees to “resign to the public” his executive power by instituting one
“supreme government.”173 What defines Locke’s civil society is the availability of men
to whom grievances may be made regarding the trespass of individual rights. 174
In this way (and in this narrative) Locke finds absolute monarchies inconsistent
with civil society. The story told above was man’s purposefully removing himself from
the law of nature by erecting means of airing grievances to the state. Absolute Monarchy
from Locke’s perspective retains “both legislative and executive power in” the King
alone, leaving “no judge to be found,” no appeals of wrong doings, and likely no relief.175
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Id. at 137. And herein, we have the original of the legislative and executive power of
civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offenses are to be punished,
when committed within the common wealth; and also to determine by occasional
judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from
without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of the members,
when there shall be need. “ Id.
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In a description of Government that closely resembles the English constitution, Locke
sets forth the attributes of the legislative and executive powers, noting that while the
legislature is “supreme” the executive must retain “prerogative” to accomplish the
necessary functions of the state.176 In doing so, the executive acts in the “the people’s
trust” to act “according to the public good,”177 Specifically, the public good is definable
by the laws that restrain the executive, and protect the people from such vices as undue
taxation or takings of their property, declaring unjust wars, and the maintenance of evenhanded justice.
Locke’s narrative ends in the same place it begins: with people able to recapture
their sovereignty from despotic leaders. Specifically Locke’s remedy for the people was
available when the executive abused his executive authority by refusing to call
parliaments or by abusing his trust of maintaining the public good.
[B]etween an executive power in being, with such a
prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will for
their convening, there can be no judge on earth: as there
can be none between the legislative and the people should
either the executive or the legislative, when they have got
the power in their hands, design or go about to enslave or
destroy them. The people have no other remedy in this, as
in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to
appeal to heaven.178
Perhaps the events of Charles I’s reign remain quite fresh on Locke’s mind, with the
abrupt adjournment of Parliament in 1629; its lengthy recess until 1639, and the
episodes.179 Plausible as well is Locke’s stern warning to Charles II, and his imminent
heir to the throne as the monarchy was reinstituted. But Locke’s narrative is not confined
176
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to one tyrant: it’s applicable to all. By hedging his theory away from specifics and
towards abstract theories of cosmology, Locke develops a picture of sovereignty more
transportable than any of the other theories discussed herein. Unlike Filmer, you don’t
have to see the sovereign as only fulfilled in a monarchy; but you can.
3.

William Blackstone

Blackstone is not unaware of the manner in which cosmology and creation
informs law and political structures; he says in his introduction to the Commentaries on
the Laws of England:
Thus, when the Supreme Being formed the universe, and
created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain
principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart,
and without which it would cease to be. When he put that
matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion,
to which all moveable bodies must conform. And to
descend from the greatest operations to the smallest, when
a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he
establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for its
direction; as that the hand shall describe a given space in a
given time; to which law as long as the work conforms , so
long it continues in perfection, and answer the end of its
formation.180
Blackstone sets forth the principle that a natural function of social systems is to make
rules for their efficient operation; (and that’s what he wants us to know of the laws of
England -- that they and the branches that enforce their operations are a part of a
system).181 Foremost, Blackstone understands that government must conform to certain
natural principles of order, it’s the specific manifestations of law that concerns
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Blackstone and those manifestations will inform his narrative of law making, law
enforcing, and judicial discretion.182
Indeed, Blackstone sees the systems of Britain as being better than the other
systems of the world since in Britain, the “Constitution” affords the executive “all the
advantages of strength and dispatch, that are to be found in an absolute monarch,”183
while the legislative functions are divided into the spheres of Kings, Aristocrats, and
Commons.184 The Constitution so endowed represents all England from Peasant to Lord;
the English Constitution comprises England.185
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Id. at 49 (“By the sovereign power … is meant the making of laws; for wherever that
power resides, all others must conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the
outward form and administration of the government may put on.”)
183
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184
Id. at 49. “first the King; secondly the lords spiritual and temporal, which is an
aristocractical assembly of persons selected for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their
valour, or their property; and thirdly, the house of commons, freely chosen by the people
from among themselves. In this total body is lodged the sovereignty of Britain for the
benefit of British society.
185
Id. at 49:
Here then is lodged the sovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged
as beneficially as is possible for society. For in no other shape could we
be so certain of finding the three great qualities of government so well
and so happy united. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the
three branches separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of
either absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy; and so want two of
the three principle ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wisdom, or
power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for instance, in the
king and house of lords, our laws might be providently made, and well
executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view:
if lodged in the king and commons, we should want that circumspection
and mediatory caution, which the wisdom of the peers is to afford: if the
supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only, and the
king has not negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to
encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly
office, and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the strength of the
executive power.

But in Blackstone, the experience of Kings is really what defines sovereignty.
For example, Blackstone not only tells us that the power to dissolve a parliament rests
solely with the King,186 that Parliaments cannot exist without Kings,187 but that the
occasional termination of Parliament benefits society by refreshing Parliament on a
regular basis;188 he also turns our attention to the dangers that exist when Parliaments are
allowed to perpetually exist by showing concretely what happens:
And this would be extremely dangerous if at any time is
should attempt to encroach upon the executive; as was
fatally experienced by the unfortunate King Charles the
First who having unadvisedly passed an act to continue the
parliament then in being till such a time as it should please
to dissolve itself, as last fell a sacrifice to that inordinate
power, which he himself had consented to give them.189
King’s are entrusted with great prerogative; but that prerogative can be dangerous when
abused.
And indeed, the primary way of understanding this monarchy is as a trust on
behalf of the people. The trust that Blackstone specifically refers to consists of three
elements: “to govern according to law; to execute judgment in mercy; and to maintain the
established religion.”190 The experience of the monarchy (particularly the plight of James
II) affords Blackstone a concrete way of explaining how that trust is upheld or violated,
and then remedied within the British Constitution.191 Constitution is not the idea that the
people retain the elements of sovereignty under the terms of a social contract with its
186
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leaders. It is rather a purposeful divesting of authority from the people to a body that
contains representative, hereditary, and noble elements. Importantly, that divesting is
irrevocable. If the people once held sovereignty, they gave it up, not to a King but to a
Constitution – a constitution that includes among other things a King.
The narrative that Blackstone tells thus has two beginnings. The first under King
Egbert in the year 800 begins the reign of monarchs and ends in 1688 with the Glorious
Revolution and the abdication of government by James II.192 The Glorious Revolution
“was not a defeasance of the right of succession, and a new limitation of the Crown, by
the King and both houses of parliament: it was the act of the nation alone, upon an
apprehension that there was no King in being.”193 Blackstone specifically wants to make
clear: the abdication by James is not some act by the public that removed a tyrant from
power; nor should it be interpreted in itself as a limitation on the power of future
monarchs. Instead, it was the conscious decision by James II, in deciding to break the
people’s trust, to abdicate the throne.
Blackstone’s reading assumes that this breach was intended by James II as an
abdication. For Blackstone that is the only way to understand James II’s actions. The
mystical body existed as close to perfection as a human body could.194 And yet,
Blackstone and the English people had to make sense of this fundamental breach of the
English trust – a breach that was arguably more egregious than the over-taxation by
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Charles II or the quartering of soldiers in the city by the same.195 The only plausible
solution was that James II made the conscious decision to no longer be King when he
broke the people’s trust. It certainly helped Blackstone’s case that James peacefully left
the city, instead of fighting for his throne.
Next, Blackstone informs us that the Abdication by James II resulted not in the
termination of his reign, but in the termination of the old Constitution of Britain.
Notably, King James II “endeavored to subvert the constitution of the Kingdom,” not
just the monarchy.196 Because he broke faith, he also broke “the original contract
between King and people;… having violated the fundamental laws; and having
withdrawn himself out of this Kingdom; has abdicated the government, and that the
throne is thereby vacant.”197 And having abdicated the government, “which abdication
did not affect only the person of the King himself, but also all his heirs, and rendered the
throne absolutely and completely vacant) it belonged to our ancestors to determine.”198
Indeed, Blackstone does not render ancestors to mean necessarily the members of
Parliament, but rather “society at large.” He explains:
for, whenever a question arises between the society at large
and any magistrate vested with powers originally delegated
by that society, it must be decided by the voice of the
society itself: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to
resort to. And that these consequences were fairly deduced
from these facts, our ancestors have solemnly determined,
in a full parliamentary convention representing the whole
society.199
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One possibility is that Blackstone perceives the abdication of government by James II as
though the entire English system was tossed back towards a state of nature. Thus, the
Declaration of Rights in 1689 was not an act of Parliament, per se, but of society.
And under the English Constitution, this makes sense. Only a King can call a
Parliament. Upon a King’s demise, Parliament terminates. Thus, upon James II’s
abdication, that Parliament terminated. With no King in place, and no one able to call a
Parliament, the English Constitution was terminated with it. (Note the difference between
the mere demise of the King and the abdication by James II. With demise, there is
always a successor.200 However, by breaking the sacred line of succession, there was no
successor that the Kingship could fall upon and therefore no person who could call a
Parliament).
Finally, Blackstone believes that upon the reinstitution of the King in the form of
William of Orange, a new social contract was reached – this time expressly composed as
the Declaration of Rights.201 To be clear, the contract for the most part looks the same as
the one that James II abdicated; indeed the contract itself proclaims that the lords and
commons declare their “ancient rights and liberties.”202 The declaration of rights to
William of Orange was no Constitution – it was a marriage proposal. It laid forth the
grievances that the commonwealth shared against the prior monarch; set forth the
expectations and limitations that the people placed on the monarch; and then prayed that
200

See id. at *191 (“the grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus coronae or right to
succession to the throne of these kingdoms depends, I take to be this: ‘that the crown is,
by common law, and constitutional custom hereditary.” The title descends on “the death
or demise of the last proprietor.”).
201
See id. at 211.
202
See Declaration of Rights, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents
/upload/g04.pdf.

the Prince of Orange “accept the same accordingly.”203 Thus, upon William of Orange’s
ascension to the throne, the compact was solemnized, a Parliament was called, and the
new Constitution began.

Such is the naturalist narrative of the Glorious Revolution.

Blackstone, though has a slightly different one. He would agree with all of the
elements of the story: that England is a Constitution; that Kings call Parliaments and so
on. But his conclusion passively ignores the facets of the story and instead suggests that
the Constitution remained whole. Blackstone’s sometimes inconsistent portrayal of the
normative story that unfolded in the Glorious Revolution is certainly due to his appetite
for the English Constitution. He is quite willing to accept the normative story that was
recorded instead of concluding that the Constitution was indeed subverted. He says “I,
therefore choose to consider this great political measure upon the solid footing of
authority, than to reason in its favour from its justice, moderation, and expedience:
because that might imply a dissenting or revolting from it, in case we should think it to
have been unjust, oppressive or inexpedient.”204 Blackstone has a narrative; but, as he
acknowledges the conclusion to that narrative runs on different terms than the narrative
would suggest, partly because he foresees that the narrative itself may be subverted by
the conclusion.
What is important for our purposes is two principles: what actually happened and
what normatively happened. What happened in actuality was the removal of a King, the
reestablishment of a new monarch, and the carrying on of British government. Indeed,
the monarchs after William of Orange don’t seem to look much different from his
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predecessors.205 But normatively, the theoretical hurdles are enormous. How do you
explain the removal of an unpopular King that breaks trust with the social contract,
particularly when your social contract affords no means for his removal?206 Once
removed, how do you explain a still standing parliament that has no authority to exist
without a King to call it into session?207 But even Blackstone would agree that even if
the Glorious Revolution did not subvert the Constitution, it certainly qualified it. His
narrative importantly sees the abdication of James II as a climax in the Constitutional
narrative. After James’s abdication, and as a result of Parliament’s solicitation of
William of Orange, Blackstone can conclude that when the throne is vacant, Parliament
may choose a new King.208

****
The Kingship in England relates to the realm according to the story you tell.
Those stories have normative values of what the beginning means. And accordingly,
those beginnings shape the way each writer perceives the sovereign’s relationship to the
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realm. For some the notion of King Conqueror explains why no court can have
jurisdiction over him; for Filmer and his followers Fatherhood explains his normative
conflation of scripture and reality. Likewise the Lockean and Blackstonean narratives
describe norms qualified by Human imperfections. In all three narrative forms, as the
normative values begin to align, the story teller weaves his conceptions of the normative
values into history, making them appear to be timeless truths, when instead they are more
likely new found alterations that explain the story being told.209
From the American perspective, the conflicting narratives of Locke and
Blackstone do reveal a certain attribute of how a sovereign should be understood. First,
both demonstrate that the narrative relates directly to how the story is formulated. For
Locke, the story is about how humans create states. Therefore, his principles are timeless
and are drawn, not from English historical texts, but from his notion of creation. For
Blackstone, his narrative is about England, specifically that attribute of English politics
that we call the English Constitution. Importantly, both narratives, even at points that are
problematic, remain true to their story. In the next section, we show how American
jurisprudence conflated the two and created a fiction that existed away from its narrative.
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